Demilitarization in the Contemporary World

4 Constrained Rearmament in Japan, 1945–1954

4 Constrained Rearmament in Japan, 1945–1954 US Strategic Preference for Securing Military Bases and Impact of Japanese Financial Community yoneyuki sugita The research question in this chapter investigates what made it possible for Japan to implement “constrained rearmament” despite strong pressure domestically and from the United States to carry out rapid rearmament. Both external and internal factors are relevant. This chapter presents and verifies the hypothesis that two important factors led to Japan’s establishing firm ground for constrained rearmament from the late 1950s onward. The first of these is the US strategic preference for securing military bases in Japan instead of Japan’s rearmament. The second is the implementation of tightmoney policies precipitated by the Dodge Line of 1949, which culminated in a one-trillion-yen budget for Japan in 1954. Japan’s rearmament started during the Allied occupation and continued afterward, but the size and speed of military expenditures were considerably less than US requests; thus what Japan effectively carried out was a constrained rearmament.USmilitarystrategytowardpost-occupationJapanwasanimportantfactorinfosteringthisconstrainedrearmament ,asitplacedmoreemphasis on retaining US military bases in Japan than on coercing Japan to implement massive and rapid rearmament. In addition, many domestic factors combined to form a national policy framework that supported a constrained approach to rearmament. These included the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese constitution,1 Japan’s antimilitarist norms,2 the strategy of buck-passing,3 the Yoshida Doctrine of restraining Japan’s rearmament in favor of focusing national efforts on economic development,4 the shift in the United States of Japan policy priorities from strengthening Japan’s self-defense forces to promoting 90 . japan economic and political stability,5 and civilian priority in civic-military relations in postwar Japan.6 No less important was the state of Japan’s postwar finances. The level and scope of rearmament hinged upon the defense budget or, more generally, Japan’s fiscal policy. An increasing number of researchers point out that the Ministry of Finance and major bankers exerted an important influence on the decision-making process for Japanese defense policy in the late 1950s.7 Certainly the Ministry of Finance increased its influence over defense policiesinthelate1950s,butinfacttheministryconsolidateditspowerbetween 1949 and 1954. During this period the Bank of Japan also secured a powerful inside role, allowing it to work in its own way to promote constrained rearmament . As discussed in this chapter, the turning point for the Japanese financial community’s ability to gain a powerful hand in steering Japan toward a course of restrained rearmament was the Dodge Line in 1949. US Strategic Thinking Concerning Japan us military commitment to japan As early as 1946, the US military considered using Japan’s military potential to win a war against the Soviet Union.8 One person who agreed with this idea in principle was US Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, who in May 1948 said in his recommendation submitted to the Pentagon, “Solely from [the] military viewpoint, the establishment of Japanese armed forces is desirable . . . The critical shortage of manpower in our own armed forces makes it mandatory that we employ only minimum forces in the Far East.” However , Japan’s depressed economy prevented Royall from pursuing this idea. He was forced to concede that “the establishment of even limited Japanese armed forces . . . is not practicable and advisable at this time; because . . . Japan’s deficient economy cannot now support a program of limited military armament without additional and prolonged outside assistance.”9 In support of Royall’s recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in March 1949 that even limited Japanese rearmament in the near future was probably impractical.10 In addition, Washington did not trust Japan, its former enemy, to control its own military future. Rearmament of Japan was regarded by many as risky, if not dangerous. In July 1949 the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) emphasized the unpredictable consequences of Japanese rearmament: “Even if Japan’s military defenses were re-established . . . there would be no assurance that those forces would be used in opposition to Communism, if there were compelling economic reasons for an accommodation with the Communist constrained rearmament · 91 world.” Aside from trust issues, probable negative reactions from Japan’s former enemies to the country’s rearmament also had to be acknowledged. This led the CIA to conclude that the “reluctance of former enemies to permit a Japanese military renascence will probably preclude Japan’s complete defensive...