Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency

11. The KLA in the Dock

167 11 The KLA in the Dock The Accused Ramush Haradinaj . . . personally ordered, controlled and participated in beatings of persons detained by his forces and taking no active part in hostilities, and on other occasions . . . encouraged or instigated criminality by members of his own forces. . . . He personally participated in the abduction of persons who were later found murdered. . . . —Haradinaj Indictment 26 Thanks to Ramush Haradinaj’s dynamic leadership, strong commitment, and vision, Kosovo is today closer than ever before to achieving its aspirations in settling its future status. Personally, I am saddened to no longer be working with a close partner and friend. In his decision today, Mr. Haradinaj has once again put the interests of Kosovo above his own personal interests. . . . The decision announced by Mr. Haradinaj to co-operate with the Tribunal, despite his firm conviction of innocence . . . is . . . an example of Kosovo’s growing political maturity as a responsible member of the international community. I trust that Mr. Haradinaj will again be able to serve Kosovo to whose better future he has sacrificed and contributed so much. —Søren Jessen-Petersen Any story of the KLA would be incomplete without considering postwar prosecution of many KLA leaders for war crimes. Postconflict political evolution in Kosovo was significantly affected by these prosecutions , a new feature of the international legal order, born of the desire to do something about Milosevic. The International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, established ostensibly to try Milosevic and 168 kosovo liberation army other perpetrators of human rights violations in Bosnia and Croatia, later turned its sights on the KLA, joined by local Kosovar courts armed with jurisdiction and staffed by international judges. After the war, three high-level KLA commanders, Remi, Limaj, and Haradinaj, were prosecuted for war crimes, along with key subordinates. Remi was tried in Kosovo by international judges; Limaj and Haradinaj were prosecuted in The Hague by the ICTY. Remi was convicted, but his conviction was reversed on appeal. Limaj was acquitted in November 2005.1 Haradinaj, indicted in March 2005, was scheduled to be tried beginning in January 2007, then postponed to March 2007. Daut Haradinaj , Ramush’s younger brother, and other KLA fighters from the Dukagjini region, were convicted of the postconflict brutalization of wartime adversaries. Pashtrik Zone commander Selim Krasniqi was convicted, retried after winning an appeal, and convicted again of orchestrating the postwar murder of another KLA commander who had become a postwar adversary. Both of these prosecutions were tried by Kosovo courts staffed by international judges. These were only the most visible cases. The prosecutions unsettled some supporters of the KLA, especially inside Kosovo. Internationally, they fueled arguments that conflicts in the Balkans were intractable, and without heroes or victims, because of a legacy of “ancient ethnic hatreds” that would always play out through interethnic brutality. They angered much of the Kosovar Albanian public , who saw the prosecutions as examples of yet another international betrayal of Albanian dreams. The prosecutions greatly complicated postwar political development. They removed, at least for a time, strong leadership figures who could have played more important roles in strengthening democratizing political institutions in postconflict Kosovo. Remi, Haradinaj, and Limaj were charismatic figures whose wartime leadership fueled hopes that they could provide effective, results-oriented leadership for the postconflict political system. For the most part, the popularity of KLA war crimes defendants increased among the local Albanian population when they were accused. Indeed, when Haradinaj’s indictment became public and he resigned as prime minister, the top UN civil administrator in Kosovo praised his political work and called him “my friend.” UNMIK subsequently , doggedly, and successfully sought to persuade the ICTY to release Haradinaj from pretrial custody, and to permit him to resume active and public involvement in Kosovo politics.2 When Limaj was acquitted, he returned to a hero’s welcome in Kosovo. The prosecution of KLA leaders electrified the population in Kosovo, which had favored prosecution of The KLA in the Dock 169 Serbs but thought that its own fighters were justified in defending both themselves and the Albanian population against Milosevic. The prosecutions also raised questions about the fairness and utility of the international enthusiasm for war crimes trials. Always subjected to pressure to be “even-handed” in its justice, the ICTY indicted the KLA leaders for mistreating Serbs, Roma, and Albanians suspected (the KLA defendants allege) of spying or collaborating with the regime during the...