Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency

7. Training

100 7 Training Guerrillas don’t need any training. They just need to be motivated and physically fit, and have sense enough not to talk or to smoke while they’re hiding. All they have to do is to follow their leader’s instructions when he tells them where to position themselves. He tells them, “Shoot when I shoot. Run after me when I run up into the hills.” His fighters don’t require much instruction to follow those orders. As to weapons training, anyone can show him how to operate an AK-47 in five minutes. As long as a fighter can point it in the right direction and pull the trigger, he’s doing enough. Earlier, the squad leader would have picked out the best shot when they shot at bottles or trees, and given him the sniper rifle. —General David Grange Before mid-1998, most KLA fighters received no training. They just got guns, teamed up with some of their buddies, and improvised attacks on police stations. As the conflict intensified in late 1997 and early 1998, and after the number of volunteers mushroomed following the Jashari Massacre, training was organized, after mid-1998, on a more or less systematic basis in each of the three main operational zones: Dukagjini, Drenica, and Llap. All of the training activities made use of practical knowledge gained by some KLA officers from their service in the VJ or in MUP. A number brought knowledge and experience from fighting with Croatian forces against the VJ. To the extent that training materials were used, they came mostly from Albanian Army or VJ sources. Few if any printed materials were prepared by the KLA itself. Training curricula and methods varied widely. Training was most highly organized in Llap. In Drenica, it varied according to brigade and the pref- Training 101 erence of the brigade commander until late in the war. In Dukagjini, it also varied, tending to occur at lower organizational levels, if at all. The intensity of the fighting in Dukagjini made it more difficult for soldiers to take time off from fighting to train, and Zone Commander Ramush Haradinaj was not enthusiastic about formal training. Need for Training Insurgencies have less need for formal training than regular armies. They also have less capacity to conduct it. Commander Ramush Haradinaj believed that the best way to learn how to fight effectively was actually to fight—as soon as possible. “No, we didn’t train them for two weeks! Not even thirty minutes,” he said. “We gave them a gun, and sent them to fight. They would learn how to use the weapon by shooting it at the enemy. If they really had to, they could shoot at a tree on the way to a fight.” Soldiers confirm what Haradinaj said: “Despite efforts to organize training, people already on the ground had to learn in battle. . . . The average soldier was strong because he had worked in the fields . . . was committed . . . was taught how to shoot, but aside from that, he only knew how to stand his ground—nothing fancy.” Nevertheless, by mid-1998, most KLA soldiers received some systematic training. This may in part have been driven by the KLA’s obsession with being perceived as a real “army,” rather than a ragtag guerrilla band. When the KLA began engaging in frontal warfare in mid-summer 1998, what would have been adequate for impromptu hit-and-run attacks was no longer sufficient. Training produces better troops. They are less likely to break and run if they know what to expect. They can be more resourceful and able to act appropriately on their own when confronted with the unexpected. They are likely to have greater stamina, to defend themselves better, and to avoid mistakes like shooting too soon before a target is in range, or failing to pick the best terrain from which to attack or to defend a position. Models KLA training can be compared to a variety of models. The models share with each other and with the several variants of KLA training the same goals and also share most of the same subject matter. The KLA training curricula cut some corners, but they were appropriate corners to cut. All of the training models include obedience and military discipline, tactics, weapons, communications, physical conditioning and agility, and military and international law. All further promote leadership, principles of 102 kosovo liberation...