In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Introduction: Care—an Evolving Definition The history of care shows that, at one level, care is a precondition for the whole of moral life. —Warren T. Reich, Encyclopedia of Bioethics Breathing differs somewhat from most other involuntary body functions.The process continues without conscious control,as do all such functions, yet we can consciously and intentionally regulate it. We can attend to and control our breathing or completely ignore its ongoing rhythm in our lives. In fact, despite its involuntary nature, it figures as a focal point for relaxation and wellness techniques that involve efforts at deep, slow breathing. Care, too, is so basic to human functioning that we can easily overlook it as a significant element in moral decision making. When we choose to do so, however, we can attend to care, cultivate the habits of care, and thematize care. Still, care is such an integral part of our daily activity that it remains ignored and unthematized . The many uses of the word care demonstrate this term’s centrality to popular discourse on relational considerations.1 It is difficult to imagine negotiating our day-to-day existence without drawing extensively on notions of care or relying on the subtle habits of care that govern our social interactions (e.g., touch, eye contact, posture, inflection). Until recently, perhaps because care is so basic to human existence, Western philosophical discourse has largely ignored its significance in human morality.2 Although many mainstream philosophers may not have fully accepted care ethics, certain pockets of thinkers are giving it a great deal of attention. The Encyclopedia of Bioethics devotes twenty-five pages to care, discussing the history of the notion, its application to health care, and the contemporary understanding of an ethics of care. Despite this lengthy treatment, a clear definition of care never emerges: “The history [of care] reveals, not a uni- fied idea of care, but a family of notions of care.”3 In this book I will attempt 00.intro.1-8/Hamington 4/7/04, 8:17 AM 1 2 Introduction to contribute to the evolving understanding of care by attending to its embodied aspects. Specifically, I will address how physicality—our embodied nature—contributes to care. Furthermore, I will explore how such embodied care advances social morality. Before going too far into the arguments, I should clarify some terminology . First, I distinguish “care” from “care ethics.” I view care ethics as an expression of a moral theory derived from the work of feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings. The term care ethics implies a self-contained theory of ethics that can be compared and contrasted to other theories . Aside from chapter 1, where I consider various care theorists to assess the state of the discourse, this book addresses care rather than care ethics. This distinction rests on my understanding of care as more than just another ethical theory. Care is an approach to morality that is basic to human existence —so basic, I will argue, that our bodies are built for care—and therefore can be woven into traditional theories.Care is a way of being in the world that the habits and behaviors of our body facilitate. Care consists of practices that can be developed or allowed to atrophy.Indeed,although I will theorize about care, care is not a moral theory in the traditional sense. So what is care? There is a great deal of confusion surrounding its definition .As Nel Noddings explains, “Most people agree that the world would be a better place if we all cared more for one another, but despite that initial agreement we find it hard to say exactly what we mean by caring.”4 Part of the confusion may be due to the contextual nature of care.Because care does not rely on the universal principles or formulas that other ethical approaches employ, it cannot be completely articulated apart from the particular agents and situations involved. Another aspect of the confusion surrounding care may be due to the embodied and affective knowledge that informs care,a point for which I will argue later.Such knowledge does not easily translate into well-defined terms. Even the theorists who write about care ethics struggle to define care.Carol Gilligan never really delineates exactly what constitutes care, and Nel Noddings ’s definition of caring as receiving others on their own terms has been described as “less than rigorous” by at...

Share