Cover

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Frontmatter

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Contents

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p. vii

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Preface

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pp. ix-x

We began this project coming from different theoretical orientations, but with a common intuition: that a great deal of contemporary research, and a greater quantity of political rhetoric, made mean-spirited assumptions about public servants in local, state, and federal bureaucracies. How different is the academic's assumption of the leisure-maximizing subordinate from the politician's...

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1. Bureaucracy and the Politics of Everyday Life

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pp. 1-24

The perfonnance of government bureaucrats matters in profound ways to the day-to-day lives of American citizens. Decisions by unseen bureaucrats affect the safety of our homes, the quality of our air and water, the conditions of our workplaces, the security of our shores, the education of our children, the vulnerability of our national defense, and the surety of banks and insurance....

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2. Why Supervision Fails to Induce Compliance

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pp. 25-46

Hierarchical control is an old problem stalking many domains.1 How might presidential administrations or congressional oversight committees prodactivity from recalcitrant bureaucrats? How do supervisors make and enforce rules successfully? What determines whether a production unit produces efficiently? How do workers learn standard operating procedures? These questions...

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3. Foundations of Organizational Compliance

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pp. 47-74

Political scientists often view democratic accountability in a bureaucracy as depending on whether political superiors are able to persuade their subordinates to comply with specific requests for the implementation of policy. In chapter 2, we demonstrated that a supervisor's expectations about performance vitally depend upon the preferences of her subordinates. Supervision does not "induce"...

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4. The Preferences of Federal Bureaucrats

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pp. 75-92

Our models of bureaucratic behavior depart from those of prior scholars of bureaucracy when we argue that bureaucrats prefer nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary rewards. In this first empirical chapter, we look to the descriptive infonnation taken from a series of three massive surveys of the federal bureaucracy in 1979, 1983, and 1992. With descriptive statistics from these surveys,...

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5. Working and Shirking in the Federal Bureaucracy

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pp. 93-108

Federal bureaucrats favor pecuniary rewards. Few are satisfied with their current pay, but most feel that there is very little they could do to secure greater pecuniary rewards. Federal bureaucrats consider themselves to be hard workers, an opinion shared by fellow bureaucrats and their supervisors. The puzzle...

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6. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage in Social Work

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pp. 109-129

We shift the lens of our study of bureaucracy away from the federal government toward local government and the activity of social workers. One theme of our book is that scholars can acquire new insights by thinking about bureaucrats as individual actors with varying preferences for pecuniary, functional, or solidary rewards. As the reader will see in this chapter, social workers express...

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7. Donut Shops and Speed Traps

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pp. 131-147

Police officers are a second archetype of the "street-level bureaucrat," closely following the terms of Weber's bureaucracy.1 Police forces are bound not only by federal, state, and local laws and ordinances, but also by scads of departmental rules and infonnal practices. These rules specify jurisdictions which,...

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8. Policing Police Brutality

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pp. 149-171

Trials of police officers in the early 1990s for beating black motorists in Los Angeles and Detroit demonstrate that police brutality persists as a compelling public policy issue. Police brutality is an exceptional case of defection--defection against the public, against the law, against simple decency. The public policy problem of regulating brutality makes this a worthy subject of...

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9. Smoke Detectors or Fire Alarms

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pp. 173-189

In one of the most influential arguments on political oversight of bureaucracy, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) observe that congressional committees need not be actively involved in the policing of administrative agencies in order to exercise significant control over the performance of those agencies. Instead of regular and intensive scrutiny of the performance of federal agencies (the "police...

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10. Routes to Democratic Control of Bureaucracy

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pp. 191-202

We have now examined bureaucrats at local, state, and federal levels of government. These bureaucrats perform a wide variety of tasks, but the principal forces that affect how hard they work are strikingly similar. We have two aims in this chapter: to recapitulate our findings in terms of the possibility for democratic control of the unelected bureaucracy and to explicate implications...

Appendixes

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pp. 203-245

References

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pp. 247-262

Index

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pp. 263-270