Contents

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1. Introduction

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pp. 1-7

Each time a representative faces a decision about policy, her constituents face a decision about trust. Should they defer to their representative's judgment or demand that she act as they think best? By virtue of their office, representatives are better informed about the policy process. They hold private information ...

Part 1: A Theory of Trust

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2. Trust, Democratic Theory, and the Electoral Connection

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pp. 11-38

This chapter sets out the context of trust decisions. It begins by describing constituents as policy-minded actors who make retrospective evaluations with the goal of controlling their representative's behavior and assessing her performance in office. Unfortunately, constituents are often ill informed about the ...

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3. Assumptions about Decisions and Beliefs

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pp. 39-62

This chapter sets out three assumptions that underlie later analysis. The first, and fundamental, assumption is that representatives and constituents are rational actors who gather and use information in a systematic, predictable manner. The second assumption is that a representative's explanations-attempts ...

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4. The Leeway Hypothesis

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pp. 63-91

In this chapter I construct a game, the Evaluation game, and use it to develop predictions about trust. These predictions are summarized by a hypothesis the leeway hypothesis. In addition, I use the game to evaluate the concept of induced ideal points. This test confirms the doubts raised in chapter 2: while ...

Part 2: The Theory Applied

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Introduction to Part 2

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pp. 95-98

Chapters 5 and 6 tum to the real world of congressional politics, testing the leeway and explanation hypotheses by examining two cases: the passage of the Ethics Act of 1989 and the late-1989 repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. In particular, these tests exploit variables coded from interviews ...

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5. Raising Pay without Losing Office: The Ethics Act of 1989

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pp. 99-122

The focus of this chapter is HR 3660, the Ethics Act of 1989. To many observers, the surprising thing about the Ethics Act was that anyone voted for it, much less a majority. Since the Founding, public opposition to pay raises has been nearly uniform (Davidson 1980; Fisher 1980; Wilkerson 1991). Not surprisingly, elected officials disagree with their constituents about the need to ...

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6. Analyzing the Inexplicable: The Repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act

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pp. 123-145

This chapter continues the empirical analysis by examining the repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. To many pundits, the enactment and subsequent repeal of this program was no surprise: Congress simply responded to demands expressed by an important voting bloc. By this logic, seniors favored Catastrophic Coverage when it was enacted, then changed ...

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7. Conclusions

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pp. 147-167

This book began with a series of questions. Why do constituents trust elected officials? What factors make trust likely-or unlikely? And how do a representative's expectations about trust influence her behavior? I am now in a position to offer some answers. The first section of this chapter reiterates and ...

Appendixes

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pp. 171-200

References

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pp. 201-208

Author Index

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pp. 209-211

Subject Index

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pp. 213-216