Politics, Policy, and Risky Technologies
Publication Year: 1997
Published by: University of Michigan Press
Figures and Tables
Complex and risky technologies are an engine for economic growth in our society. Nonetheless, these new technologies also pose many problems for political leaders and the policymakers responsible for overseeing them. While some elements in our society may wish to tum back the clock to a simpler time, the truth of the matter is that...
The process of seeing this book through from an idea to a published manuscript has been a long one indeed. I have many people to thank, starting with some of my professors in graduate school. Bill Lowry served as my adviser in graduate school and has continued to read my work and comment on it over the years. Not only is he an insightful professor, he is a good friend, and I am grateful for his help. John Gilmour and Jack...
Chapter 1. Understanding Agency Failure
On January 28, 1986, the entire nation focused on a single event. Seventy-three seconds after liftoff, the space shuttle Challenger was destroyed in a powerful explosion fifty thousand feet above the Kennedy Space Center. The losses resulting from this catastrophe were quite high. Seven astronauts, including Teacher-in-Space Christa McAuliffe, were killed...
Chapter 2. Reliable Decision Making and the Influence of Political Incentives
In the months that followed the Challenger disaster, it was revealed that NASA had known about the problem of the eroding O-rings well in advance of the accident. Many commentators portrayed the decision to launch the ill-fated mission in light of such information as an irrational one. Performing a simple cost-benefit analysis would seem to support...
Chapter 3. Shifting Political Incentives at NASA and the FDA
Unfortunately, it is difficult to eliminate type I and type II errors at the same time. Allocating resources or employing personnel in such a way as to reduce the incidence of one type of failure often serves to increase the probability that the other form of failure will occur. For example, it will be shown in the next chapter that organizational structures that limit type...
Chapter 4. Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems
As I have shown in the last chapter, both NASA and the FDA in the 1980s had to contend with growing political pressure to reduce the likelihood of potential type II failures. In response to these demands, we might expect that each agency instituted some significant organizational changes. This expectation, however, raises a number of important questions. What exactly...
Chapter 5. Subordinate Expertise and Reliable Organizations
It was established in the previous chapter that reorganization can affect the reliability of agency decisions. That is important when we consider that one of the more popular activities of politicians involved in administrative affairs is to reorganize the bureaucracy. Of course, there are a number of reasons why this practice is so prevalent. In some cases, as in the Nixon...
Chapter 6. Systems versus Components: Seeking Greater Reliability at NASA and the FDA
Wernher von Braun, the father of modem rocketry, once said, "We can lick gravity, but sometimes the paperwork is overwhelming."1 The success of the space program, however, has as much to do with organizational management as it does with technological advancement. Without large-scale cooperation within NASA and between other agencies, reaching our...
Chapter 7. Acceptable Risks
At the beginning of this book, concern was expressed over a single, dramatic incident: the destruction of the space shuttle Challenger. Given NASA's long history of reliable performance, such a dramatic failure seemed almost inconceivable. Further, as evidence following the accident revealed major technical problems with the shuttle, it was seemingly irrational...
Page Count: 208
Illustrations: 26 figures, 2 tables
Publication Year: 1997
OCLC Number: 681961403
MUSE Marc Record: Download for Acceptable Risks