Cover

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Frontmatter

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Contents

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Acknowledgments

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pp. ix-xi

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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pp. 1-11

On May 2, 1997, Tony Blair, an advocate of “Christian socialism” since his university days, became prime minister of the first Labour government in Britain in eighteen years. On May 6, his “New Labour” government moved to enhance the independence of the Bank of England by transferring day-to-day control over monetary policy from Whitehall to...

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Chapter 2 The Structural Context of Macroeconomic Policy Choice

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pp. 13-39

Both the partisan and electoralist models tend to assume that incumbents have sufficient control over the instruments of monetary and fiscal policy that they can produce the macroeconomic outcomes they desire. In the partisan model, this means manipulating monetary and fiscal instruments so as to produce the combination of growth, employment, and inflation most preferred by the incumbent’s constituency...

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Chapter 3 Partisanship and Fiscal and Monetary Policy

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pp. 41-83

At the beginning of this book, I pointed to the apparent rightward leaning of British prime minister Tony Blair and German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as two instances of the popular view of the effects of globalization. It is frequently argued that in today’s global economy, left-wing politicians have had to mimic the policy actions...

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Chapter 4 Elections and Fiscal and Monetary Policy

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pp. 85-104

In the previous chapter, evidence was presented that called into question the partisan perspective on macroeconomic policy. The extant empirical literature is full of contradictory findings.An attempt to control for the modifying effects of institutional context deduced from the theoretical models in chapter 2 failed to clarify this web of tangled...

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Chapter 5 Partisan Differences and Macroeconomic Outcomes

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pp. 105-140

In this chapter, I examine arguments about the effect of the partisan composition of government on macroeconomic performance. I examine propositions, including those drawn from the game-theoretic model in chapter 2, regarding the effects of central bank independence, capital mobility, and eroding national policy autonomy on partisan differences in macroeconomic performance. I begin with a reexamination...

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Chapter 6 Elections and Macroeconomic Outcomes

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pp. 141-167

In chapters 3 and 5, I presented evidence that called into question the existence of partisan differences both in the use of monetary and fiscal policy instruments and in macroeconomic outcomes. The scarcity of partisan differences, furthermore, appears to be general. Before and after capital mobility, under fixed and flexible exchange rates, under...

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Chapter 7 Conclusion

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pp. 169-176

I have offered detailed and, I hope, measured summaries of this book’s empirical findings at the end of each of the empirical chapters. In this conclusion, I emphasize the broadest findings and what I see as their main implications, attempting to step out from among the trees and get a glimpse of the broader forest. The empirical...

Appendix A Derivation of Proposition 1

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pp. 177-178

Notes

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pp. 179-192

References

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pp. 193-203

Index

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pp. 205-210