Publication Year: 1982
Published by: Hong Kong University Press, HKU
As long as subject is centred in a phenomenal object, and thinks and speaks therefrom, subject is identified with that object and is bound. As long as such condition obtains, the identified subject can never be free—for freedom is liberation from that identification. ...
We tend to misunderstand the nature, and exaggerate the importance, of 'time' and 'space'. There are no such 'things' (they do not exist in their own right): these come into apparent existence, i.e., they 'function' only as a mechanism whereby events, extended spatially and sequentially, may become cognisable. They accompany events and render their development realisable. ...
The phenomenal is conceptual—appearance or form, the interdependent counterpart of which is the non-phenomenal, which is also conceptual—non-appearance or formlessness. The source of the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal ('the world of form and the formless world' as the Masters referred to them) is noumenon. ...
The Hrdaya—usually called the Heart Sutra—is commonly said to represent the quintessence of the Prajnaparamita doctrine. Its importance is so well understood that it is recited daily in monasteries, a practice which does not necessarily lead to its general understanding. This rendering is based on the three principal sources—Sanscrit, Chinese and Tibetan, but it is not a direct translation. ...
The concept of contraries is an effect of the concept of time: it is the result of a phenomenal extension of events in a context of duration, as, for instance, before and after, fast and slow, early and late. It is also an effect of the concept of space: a result of phenomenal extension therein, as, for instance, left and right, up and down, long and short. From the concept of space-time arise interdependent counterparts such as subject and object, positive and negative, yin and yang, alternating in time and separate in space. ...
Is it possible to be rid of the concept of 'other' without at the same time being rid of the concept of 'I', or to be rid of the concept of 'I' without at the same time being rid of the concept of 'other'? It is not possible. With which should one begin? With neither. An identified subject cannot rid itself of either concept. ...
Page Count: 206
Publication Year: 1982
OCLC Number: 794700931
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