Cover

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Title Page, Copyright, Dedication

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Contents

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pp. vii-viii

List of Maps

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pp. ix-x

Abbreviations

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pp. xi-xii

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Preface

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pp. xiii-xviii

After a reluctant start, American leadership of the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia ended the most destructive set of regional conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Europe since World War II. ...

Part 1. Bosnia: Shuttle Diplomacy

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pp. 1-2

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1. Welcome to the Balkans

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pp. 3-6

The blast outside our apartment building jolted us awake. Someone had blown up an empty guard shack in front of our building in Izmir, Turkey, one night in early 1980. Kathy and I quickly sheltered the kids in the back of the apartment until the police arrived. At the time, I was a major in the US Army assigned to the US mission in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Izmir. ...

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2. Fools and Madmen

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pp. 7-11

Fools and madmen are drawn easily to war—all glory and bravado in the beginning, tragedy and disaster at the end. Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Republic of Serbia, in his military adventures in the former Yugoslavia overlooked one of the most important lessons of history: wars are easy to start, but once started they often take an unpredictable path. ...

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3. The Inconvenient War

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pp. 12-19

Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. After first resisting secession with military force in Slovenia and Croatia, the government in Belgrade withdrew Serbian troops except in the border area of eastern Croatia. When a Muslim-dominated Bosnian government in Sarajevo proclaimed independence in 1992, ...

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4. Genocide

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pp. 20-24

The intelligence pictures showed women and girls boarding buses lined up on the streets in the center of town. The buses validated other reports that the men and boys were being separated from the females.
“God help those poor people in that miserable place,” I thought as I looked at the pictures at my desk in the Pentagon in July 1995. ...

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5. Death on a Balkan Mountain

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pp. 25-29

The driver maneuvered his heavy armored personnel carrier around a slower vehicle on the rain-soaked gravel road on the side of Mount Igman. He was trying to keep up with the lighter military vehicle ahead of him carrying Holbrooke and Lieutenant General Clark to Sarajevo. ...

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6. The Godfather

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pp. 30-55

Unlike many US leaders, especially in the Pentagon, I believed that Bosnia was important. I felt that the situation there was a defining moment for the United States in Europe and in NATO in the post-Soviet era and that the United States could no longer avoid active engagement in the war. ...

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7. Lifting the Siege

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pp. 56-71

Holbrooke wanted an agreement to end the siege of Sarajevo, but he had to move quickly. NATO was running out of targets and could not sustain the air campaign much longer.
He again passed up the comfortable front cabin of the plane to stuff himself in the back with the rest of us. ...

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8. A Certain Kind of Technology

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pp. 72-75

We had more room and the environment was less frantic without Holbrooke on the flight to Belgrade. Milosevic was waiting for Chris Hill, Roberts Owen, and me at the presidential palace for a strategy session before we met with the Bosnian Serbs. This meeting was to hear his advice on how the US negotiators ...

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9. Sarajevo

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pp. 76-87

Holbrooke wanted to broker a total cease-fire in Bosnia and to set up proximity talks for the middle of October 1995 during this trip to the region. But a conference in mid-October, given the time available, seemed unlikely. ...

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10. The Last Shuttle

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pp. 88-104

Holbrooke and the team had almost a full week in Washington before returning to the region for the last shuttle before the proximity talks. This gave us time to tidy up the details to ensure the process was moving on all fronts. ...

Part 2. Bosnia: The Dayton Agreement

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pp. 105-106

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11. High Stakes in Ohio

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pp. 107-118

Richard Holbrooke carried the burden of success or failure of the Dayton talks. Others contributed, but Holbrooke was the ringmaster, and he liked a disorderly and stressful show. In disorder and pressure, he found opportunity. ...

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12. Get an Agreement or Shut It Down

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pp. 119-135

Warren Christopher stopped at Dayton early on November 14 before continuing to Japan. The secretary of state would come back to the talks when he returned from Asia at the end of the week. The message to Holbrooke was short and clear: “Get initials on an agreement or close down the talks,” Christopher told the US negotiator. ...

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13. Richard Holbrooke

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pp. 136-140

Dayton was a historic accomplishment, and overall credit for the peace agreement in Bosnia belongs to Richard Holbrooke, the diplomatic engine of the Dayton Agreement. The negotiations produced a powerful performance in a major international crisis by this senior American diplomat at the top of his game. His focus, his drive and energy, ...

Part 3. Bosnia: Military Stability

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pp. 141-142

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14. A President’s Commitment

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pp. 143-150

In January 1996, the people of Sarajevo were just beginning to clear away the rubble and the barricades from the war. I flew there quickly to give confidence to the Muslim leaders that the United States would follow through on its commitment to arm and train their military. In Washington, the Train and Equip (T&E) Program team was just beginning to become functional. ...

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15. Getting Started

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pp. 151-154

With a concept approved, an organization in place, and the drawdown of US equipment authorized, the T&E team left Washington for the former Yugoslavia region as the calendar turned to the new year. The first step was to explain the US program to the recipients, potential donors, and skeptics in Europe. ...

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16. Two Conditions

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pp. 155-157

The Institute of Defense Analysis study presented during the Dayton negotiations had concluded that training was needed throughout the Muslim-Croat Federation military structure, especially in the noncommissioned officer corps. Once the Federation leaders were convinced that modern training was a priority task, the next step was an agreement that the NATO ...

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17. International Donors

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pp. 158-167

I knew nothing about raising international donor money when the T&E Program started. In my ignorance, I believed that wealthy Muslim societies, outraged by the plight of Muslims in Bosnia during the war, would easily open their wallets for an American-run program to give the Bosnian Muslims a self-defense capability. After all, ...

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18. Hard Choices

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pp. 168-172

Oversight of international donor funding and control of the flow of military equipment and training gave the T&E Program powerful leverage over the Bosniak and Croatian authorities in the Federation. The T&E team used that leverage to pressure the two components of the Federation to meet the conditions that would allow the program to start. ...

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19. No Easy Prey

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pp. 173-175

Less than a week after the White House announced the beginning of the T&E Program, the Federation leaders signed the one-year commercial contract with MPRI to assist in training and advising the Federation. International donor funds paid the $40 million cost of the contract. ...

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20. Wrestling an Alligator

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pp. 176-189

The weapons necessary to properly equip a modest Federation Armed Force came from a variety of sources. The heart of the equipment program was the authority, approved by Congress, to transfer $100 million worth of excess US military equipment and services to Bosnia. ...

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21. Impact

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pp. 190-192

As Yugoslavia fractured, the Serbs tried and failed to kill, drive away, or subjugate millions of largely secular Muslims in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. In confronting Serbian war crimes, the United States and its allies had two choices in dealing with the Muslim victims in the Balkans. ...

Part 4. Kosovo: War and Independence

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pp. 193-194

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22. A Land of Violence and Fear

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pp. 195-207

Shaun Byrnes, chief of the US Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), led the first of two armored US embassy sports utility vehicles out of Pristina and into the countryside on January 19, 1999. Byrnes was taking me to meet members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), ...

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23. Prelude to War

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pp. 208-223

Serbian military and MUP forces surrounded the Albanian village of Prekez early on the morning of March 5, 1998. The operation was in response to KLA attacks that had killed Serbian policemen days earlier. The goal was the capture of Adem Jashari, a known KLA leader. ...

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24. Madeleine’s War

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pp. 224-233

The NATO air campaign, Operation Allied Force, was authorized for humanitarian purposes in Kosovo. The stated objectives of the operation were to stop the violence, military actions, and repression; to remove Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo, enabling the deployment of an international military presence in Kosovo; ...

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25. Midwife to a Nation

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pp. 234-247

Kosovo was a wreck when Serbian security forces left in June 1999. Towns and villages were in shambles. Refugees were streaming back as international civilians and military forces were flowing into Kosovo. Serbian technicians and officials who worked in government agencies had fled. ...

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26. Independence

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pp. 248-254

The UN Security Council Resolution authorizing UN administration of Kosovo called for a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. After years of international governance of Kosovo, pressure was building in the summer of 2005 to start defining Kosovo’s future. ...

Part 5. Macedonia: The Ohrid Agreement

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pp. 255-256

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27. A War or a Nation?

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pp. 257-261

War again threatened the people of the Balkans, this time in Macedonia, less than two years after the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999. For six weeks in the summer of 2001, American and European diplomats struggled through fragile and stormy negotiations, riots, threats, and cease-fire violations to reach an agreement that prevented a civil war ...

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28. Pop-up Insurgency

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pp. 262-276

The Albanians in Kosovo were secure by early 2001. Kosovo was stable and governed by the UN, but Albanian trouble was brewing again elsewhere in the Balkans. A new threat to peace—the National Liberation Army—appeared in Macedonia in January when its fighters attacked a police station in the village of Tearce near the Kosovo border. ...

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29. Leo-Pard

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pp. 277-284

Macedonian security forces were fighting the NLA near Tetovo, thirty miles from Skopje, as I arrived in the Macedonian capital on Sunday, July 1, 2001. I did not know how long this assignment would last, but I knew from past Balkan exploits that the situation was delicate and would require dedicated, hands-on attention. ...

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30. Fury in Skopje

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pp. 285-299

The talks started cordially. Beginnings are typically the happy times, but I knew from previous negotiations that the early stage was the most positive period, when all parties put forth their most cooperative and optimistic image to the international visitors. It would not last. It never does. ...

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31. On the Banks of an Ancient Lake

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pp. 300-313

Lake Ohrid, its clear blue waters surrounded by natural forests and mountains, is the most beautiful freshwater lake in the Balkans. The lack of commercial development during the Communist period in a way helped protect its natural beauty from overdevelopment. The lake, fed by natural springs and almost 1,000 feet deep in places, ...

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32. The Long Struggle

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pp. 314-323

Peace agreements are just words on paper until they are implemented. Implementation is usually a struggle when agreements are reached in a confrontational negotiating atmosphere. After the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, Macedonia was no exception. Reaching the agreement took forty-four days from my arrival in Skopje on July 1, 2001, ...

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33. Turning Point

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pp. 324-334

The breakup of Yugoslavia, the most violent episode in the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, was a sequence of humanitarian and military crises that became a turning point in international relations with consequences far beyond the region. ...

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34. Crisis Management

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pp. 335-346

America’s commitment to peace in the former Yugoslavia beginning in 1995 demonstrated the value of US leadership in an international crisis. In addition to the military power, economic resources, and democratic values that the nation brings to any crisis, its leadership in the Balkans promoted a unified international response and provided energy and a sense of direction absent when the United States was on the sideline. ...

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Acknowledgments

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pp. 347-348

My account of the US-led intervention in the former Yugoslavia would never have been possible without active support from many people. First, Secretary of Defense William Perry and Undersecretary for Policy Walt Slocombe launched me into the uncharted professional waters of international diplomacy ...

Appendix

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pp. 349-360

Notes

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pp. 361-374

Bibliography

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pp. 375-376

Index

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pp. 377-406