Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture
Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World
Publication Year: 2017
Published by: The MIT Press
Half Title, Title Page, Copyright, In Memoriam
Introduction: The Interplay of Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture
Christian Tewes, Christoph Durt, Thomas Fuchs
While traditional theories of cognition tend to conceive of mental capacities as disembodied or merely supervenient on brain states, in recent decades the insight has spread that mental processes cannot be confined to activities inside the skull alone. The paradigm of enactive embodiment endeavors to overcome the limitations of traditional cognitive science by reconceiving the cognizer as an embodied being and cognition as enactive. ...
I. Phenomenological and Enactive Accounts of the Constitution of Culture
1. Intercorporeality and Intersubjectivity: A Phenomenological Exploration of Embodiment
The phenomenological movement—especially as originally developed by Husserl and elaborated by Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty—has been responsible for the radical reconception of human existence that revolutionized philosophy in the twentieth century and is still being assimilated more generally in philosophy of mind and action, as well as in the cognitive sciences ...
2. We Are, Therefore I Am—I Am, Therefore We Are: The Third in Sartre’s Social Ontology
Nicolas de Warren
The aim of this chapter is to incite you to read an unreadable book. Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason ( 2004) unquestionably ranks as one of the most unreadable books of twentieth-century philosophy, matched only, if not exceeded by its parallel project, the equally unfinished Flaubert study The Family Idiot. The Critique, in spite of being the crowning masterpiece of Sartre’s political thinking, ...
3. Consciousness, Culture, and Significance
This chapter offers a new view on the relation between consciousness and culture by investigating their intertwinement with significance. I argue that consciousness discloses aspects of significance, while culture encompasses shared significance, as well as the forms of behavior that enact significance. Significance is linguistic or nonlinguistic meaning that is (partly) understood in intersubjective engagement ...
4. Neither Individualistic nor Interactionist
Ezequiel Di Paolo, Hanne De Jaegher
Enactive approaches to social understanding have been the subject of much development and debate over the last few years. We think that these debates are fruitful, but sometimes it is useful to take stock and clarify what aspects of these discussions may point to gaps in the theory or needs for clarification, and what aspects may be rooted in misunderstandings and misinterpretations. ...
5. Continuity Skepticism in Doubt: A Radically Enactive Take
Daniel D. Hutto, Glenda Satne
Enactivists of all sorts emphasize the role of active, embodied engagement over representation when it comes to understanding cognition. For radical enactivists about cognition, RECers, this is not just a matter of emphasis: they advance a stronger claim, holding that (1) not all cognition is content involving and, especially, not its root forms (Hutto and Myin 2013).1 Even so, RECers are not content deniers; ...
II. Intersubjectivity, Selfhood, and Persons
6. The Primacy of the “We”?
Ingar Brinck, Vasudevi Reddy, Dan Zahavi
The capacity to engage in collective intentionality is a key aspect of human sociality. Social coordination might not be distinctive of humans—various nonhuman animals engage in forms of cooperative behavior (e.g., hunting together)—but humans seem to possess a specific capacity for intentionality that enables them to constitute forms of social reality far exceeding anything that can be achieved even by nonhuman primates. ...
7. Selfhood, Schizophrenia, and the Interpersonal Regulation of Experience
This paper addresses the view, currently and historically popular in phenomenological psychopathology, that schizophrenia involves disturbance of a person’s most basic sense of self, the minimal self. The concept of “minimal self” is to be understood in wholly phenomenological terms. Zahavi (2014) offers what is perhaps the most detailed characterization to date. ...
8. The Touched Self: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives on Proximal Intersubjectivity and the Self
Anna Ciaunica , Aikaterini Fotopoulou
Whenever I perceive something or feel an emotion, these perceptions and feelings are somehow given to me as mine. The idea that our everyday experiences are characterized by a prereflective sense of self, referred to as the “minimal” self, has been highlighted by a longstanding phenomenological tradition (Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty), as well as more recent authors ...
9. Thin, Thinner, Thinnest: Defining the Minimal Self
My initial work on the relationship between experience, self, and self-consciousness dates back to the late nineties (Zahavi 1999, 2000a), where I started defending the view that all three notions are interconnected and that a theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life seriously also needs to operate with a minimal notion of self. ...
10. The Emergence of Persons
Mark H. Bickhard
Within classical metaphysical frameworks, there doesn’t seem to be much that persons could be other than some sort of substance or entity. Entity-based metaphysics, however, encounter fatal problems, certainly for minds, and arguably for persons as well. Furthermore, although entity-based metaphysics, in the form of particle-based frameworks, still dominate in philosophy, ...
III. Cultural Affordances and Social Understanding
11. The Significance and Meaning of Others
In support of a pluralist approach to social cognition, I want to introduce a distinction found in debates about the nature of interpretation, namely, the distinction between meaning and significance. First I review the hermeneutical debates and several ways of thinking about the relation between significance and meaning. ...
12. Feeling Ashamed of Myself Because of You
Alba Montes Sánchez, Alessandro Salice
According to most accounts, shame is an emotion that typically focuses on the self, in the sense that its intentional object is the individual who feels it. But if this is on the right track, how is it possible for anyone to feel ashamed of what someone else does or says? Imagine that you are meeting some friends for drinks after work, and you bring along a colleague who happens to be Sicilian. ...
13. The Extent of Our Abilities: The Presence, Salience, and Sociality of Affordances
John Z. Elias
While the concept of affordances is central to broadly embodied approaches to cognition, it is often relied on without sufficient explication. Here I seek to contribute to its clarification in the course of exploring its scope. The concept in its original and basic sense refers to potentialities for action, constituted by the relationship between animals and their physical environment (Gibson 1977; Greeno 1994). ..
14. The Role of Affordances in Pretend Play
Pretending is often conceptualized as an imaginative or symbolic capacity, positing mental representations in its explanation. Traditional explanations hold that pretending is achieved by adding new meaning to the object pretended with. There is no denying that in object-substitution pretense (such as the banana-phone game), the agent uses the object differently from what the object usually designates. ...
15. Ornamental Feathers without Mentalism: A Radical Enactive View on Neanderthal Body Adornment
Neanderthals were a species of the genus Homo closely related to Homo sapiens, living between circa 250 and 38 ka. They evolved along relatively separate evolutionary paths from modern humans for several hundred thousand years, Neanderthals inhabiting a cold area in Europe, though also reaching regions in the Near East, whereas modern humans lived in a warmer African environment (Harvati 2015). ...
IV. Embodiment and Its Cultural Significance
16 Neoteny and Social Cognition: A Neuroscientific Perspective on Embodiment
In the present chapter I address the notion of embodiment from a neuroscientific perspective, by emphasizing the crucial role played by bodily relations and sociality for the evolution and development of distinctive features of human cognition. To do so, I critically frame the neuroscientific approach and discuss it against the background of the Evo-Devo paradigm, ...
17. Collective Body Memories
Human bodies are similar all over the world, but their habits, postures, and comportment are to a large extent shaped by culture. Cultures preordain and suggest certain ways of sitting, standing, walking, gazing, eating, praying, hugging, washing, and so on. In so doing, they induce certain dispositions and frames of mind associated with these bodily states and behaviors: ...
18. Movies and the Mind: On Our Filmic Body
Joerg Fingerhut, Katrin Heimann
Recent approaches in embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and affective (4EA) cognitive science1 argue that mental activity is best understood as relational: the mind is constituted by ongoing interactions between the organism and its environment and understanding the nature of those relations is therefore the main task of a science of the mind. ...
19. Painful Bodies at Work: Stress and Culture?
Peter Henningsen, Heribert Sattel
The objective of this chapter is twofold: to present data on significant cultural influences on pain-related psychosocial workplace conditions, which belong to the core issues of psychosomatic medicine, and to discuss the conceptual consequences for a cultural neuroscience of pain. To achieve this aim, we start with an introduction of the basic characteristics of chronic pain at work, ...
20. Embodiment and Enactment in Cultural Psychiatry
Laurence J. Kirmayer, Maxwell J. D. Ramstead
Cultural psychiatry aims to understand the implications of cultural diversity for psychopathology, illness experience, and intervention. The emerging paradigms of embodiment and enactment in cognitive science provide ways to approach this diversity in terms of bodily and intersubjective experience and narrative practices. In turn, cultural psychiatry provides striking examples of how cultural variations ...
Page Count: 456
Publication Year: 2017
OCLC Number: 982288032
MUSE Marc Record: Download for Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture