Cover

pdf iconDownload PDF
 

Title Page, Copyright

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. i-iv

Table of Contents

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. v-vi

List of Maps and Tables

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. vii-viii

read more

Foreword

David M. Glantz

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. ix-x

This is the second volume of C. J. Dick’s comparative critique of the differing approaches employed by the Allied powers as they conducted military operations in western and eastern Europe against the Wehrmacht of Hitler’s Germany during the summer of 1944. Unlike the first volume, which focuses on how the Western Allies conducted warfare strategically and operationally, this volume analyzes the Soviet approach to land warfare and finds it markedly different and...

read more

Acknowledgments

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. xi-xii

I found writing this book much more difficult than I had expected when I blithely embarked upon the project. There were many times when I stared glumly at my computer, bereft of ideas, or gazed at the little birds industriously building their nests in my garden fence and wished I too could be out in the sun, indeed, anywhere except at my desk. That the project came to fruition is due in significant part to my beloved wife, Heather. She tolerated my spells of irritability or abstraction,...

List of Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Selected Foreign Words

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. xiii-xiv

read more

Introduction

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 1-7

As in the first volume, my intention in volume 2 is not to tell the comprehensive story of a campaign. Rather, it is to provide enough material to support my analysis of operations to see whether they were carried out in accordance with military theory and the extent to which that theory provided a good guide to action or required modification. My methodology is also much the same as in volume 1, although it is necessarily less informed by staff rides. I was involved in only one staff ride...

read more

An Essential Guide to Soviet Military Terms and Organizations

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 8-19

The Soviets were always very precise in their use of military semantics, and their meanings have often been obscured or lost in translation. Moreover, many Soviet terms have different or alternative meanings from those with which Western readers are familiar, and the latter naturally fit such terms and, indeed, concepts into the context they already know. It is thus necessary to explain some of the vocabulary used in this volume.1 This section also outlines some unit and formation...

read more

1. Soviet Doctrine and Praxis Prior to 1944

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 20-88

Like British and American doctrine, the Red Army’s was profoundly influenced by the First World War.1 However, the Russian experience of that war was somewhat dissimilar from that of the Western Allies. Because of the great length of the Russo-German and Austro-Hungarian front—more than twice that in the west—the ratio of forces to space was much lower; consequently, there was no stalemate. It was always possible to penetrate the enemy’s front and generate...

read more

2. Strategic Offensive Operations, Summer 1944

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 89-160

The spring to late summer of 1944 saw the mounting of eight strategic and many individual front operations. This work is not a comprehensive history but a study of the development of operational art; accordingly, only three closely linked strategic offensives are considered for illustrative purposes: the Belorussian, L’vov-Sandomir, and Yassi-Kishinev Operations. Of these, the first is considered in the greatest detail because it was both bigger and more complex than...

read more

3. Operational Art in Maturity, Summer 1944

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 161-230

Field Regulations 1944 (PU-44)

Soviet commanders went into the third period of the war with a revised doctrinal guide. The experience of the first and second periods demonstrated the fundamental soundness of the concepts outlined in PU-36. However, as the introduction to PU-44 pointed out, “certain provisions” were obsolete and required thorough revision. The 1944 regulations put even more stress on having the combined-arms...

read more

4. Some Conclusions

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 231-267

The Interaction between Western and Eastern Theatres

When Britain was moving inexorably toward war with Germany in August 1939, there was deep ill will directed against the Soviet Union. Stalin’s Communist tyranny, at least as murderous as Hitler’s Nazi equivalent and avowedly bent on world revolution, had proved itself treacherous by executing a diplomatic U-turn and cynically concluding a nonaggression pact with the Reich. Such sentiments...

read more

5. Some Reflections about the Future

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 268-286

Useful lessons can be drawn from these operations of three-quarters of a century ago, though they are not prescriptive. They are very much in the vein of how to think rather than what to think. Perhaps the most basic lesson concerns the capabilities and the endurance of coalitions. The facts of politico-military life are that even an apparently strong alliance is very limited in what it can take on and what it can expect to accomplish. This enduring truth tends to be forgotten...

Notes

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 287-324

Selected Bibliography

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 325-330

Index

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 331-354

Back Cover

pdf iconDownload PDF