In this Book

The Myth and Reality of German Warfare
summary

Surrounded by potential adversaries, nineteenth-century Prussia and twentieth-century Germany faced the formidable prospect of multifront wars and wars of attrition. To counteract these threats, generations of general staff officers were educated in operational thinking, the main tenets of which were extremely influential on military planning across the globe and were adopted by American and Soviet armies. In the twentieth century, Germany's art of warfare dominated military theory and practice, creating a myth of German operational brilliance that lingers today, despite the nation's crushing defeats in two world wars.

In this seminal study, Gerhard P. Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five different armies, from the mid--nineteenth century through the early days of NATO. He also offers fresh interpretations of towering figures of German military history, including Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. Essential reading for military historians and strategists, this innovative work dismantles cherished myths and offers new insights into Germany's failed attempts to become a global power through military means.

Table of Contents

  1. Front cover
  2. restricted access Download |
  1. Title Page, Copyright
  2. pp. i-iv
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Contents
  2. pp. v-vi
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Foreword
  2. pp. vii-xii
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Preface
  2. Colonel Hans-Hubertus Mack, Ph.D.
  3. pp. xiii-xiv
  4. restricted access Download |
  1. Abbreviations and Special Terms
  2. pp. xv-xvi
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Introduction
  2. pp. 1-6
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 1 Definitions: Tactics—Operations—Strategy
  2. pp. 7-16
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 2 Factors and Constants: Space, Time, and Forces
  2. pp. 17-26
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 3 The Beginnings: Planning, Mobility, and a System of Expedients
  2. pp. 27-56
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 4 The Sword of Damocles: A Two-Front War
  2. pp. 57-98
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 5 Bitter Awakening: World War I
  2. pp. 99-132
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 6 Old Wine in New Wineskins: Operational Thinking in the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht between Reality and Utopia
  2. pp. 133-188
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 7 Lost Victories, or the Limits of Operational Thinking
  2. pp. 189-258
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 8 Operational Thinking in the Age of the Atom
  2. pp. 259-294
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Conclusion
  2. pp. 295-306
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Notes
  2. pp. 307-360
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Bibliography
  2. pp. 361-394
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Index
  2. pp. 395-432
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Color Maps
  2. restricted access Download |
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.