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This work stresses the importance, in making any choice of strategies-including the decision to use or refrain from using nuclear weapons-of gauging the intent behind the opponent's military moves. Dr. Brodie also suggests that the use or threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons may lead to de-escalation, that is, may check rather than promote the expansion of hostilities. The author applies his ideas about escalation to several imagined situations, examining them in relation to experiences in Europe, in the second Cuba crisis, and in Asia.

Originally published in 1966.

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Table of Contents

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  1. Cover
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  1. Title Page, Copyright
  2. pp. i-iv
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  1. Preface
  2. pp. v-vi
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  1. Contents
  2. pp. vii-x
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  1. Introduction
  2. pp. 3-24
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  1. I. Escalatory Fears and the Effectiveness of Local Resistance
  2. pp. 25-36
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  1. II. The Analytical Problem
  2. pp. 37-42
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  1. III. The Relevant Image of the Opponent
  2. pp. 43-62
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  1. IV. The Attenuation of Incentives for "Going First"
  2. pp. 63-68
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  1. V. What Is the Enemy up to?
  2. pp. 69-74
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  1. VI. The Status Quo as a Standard
  2. pp. 75-84
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  1. VII. On Enemy Capabilities Versus Intentions
  2. pp. 85-88
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  1. VIII. The New and Different Europe
  2. pp. 89-96
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  1. IX. How Big an Attack?
  2. pp. 97-102
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  1. X. The "Firebreak" Theory
  2. pp. 103-112
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  1. XI. Predicting the Probabilities of Escalation: Some Sample Cases
  2. pp. 113-134
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  1. Appendix: The Intractability of States
  2. pp. 135-148
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  1. Index
  2. pp. 149-151
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