Cover

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Title Page, Copyright

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Contents

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p. vii

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Preface and Acknowledgments

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p. ix

This book has a very personal beginning. After my wife and I finished graduate school, she was hired to work as a diplomat for the U.S. State Department. After the initial excitement that accompanies one’s first grown-up job (better said, vicarious excitement, because I was unemployed, having been beat out for that very same job by this wonderful woman I had married), I realized that I had absolutely no earthly idea what Nina would be doing. She was similarly...

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[1] The Value and Values of Diplomacy

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pp. 1-21

What is the value of diplomacy? How does it affect the course of foreign affairs independent of the distribution of power and foreign policy interests? Despite the centrality of diplomacy to international affairs, little is known about how it works. The notion that diplomacy matters probably strikes most as intuitively obvious, yet most accounts of diplomacy are personalistic accounts of the triumphs of particular state representatives, with little effort made...

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[2] Creating Value

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pp. 22-57

Although diplomacy is arguably the most prevalent activity in interstate relations, rigorous theoretical and careful empirical work on diplomacy in international relations is extremely sparse (Der Derian 1987: 91; Sharp 2009: 1–2). Those few scholars who have explicitly engaged the subject complain that “IR [international relations] theory . . . has yet to give a theoretical account of what diplomacy...

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[3] Tabling the Issue

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pp. 58-86

European foreign relations in the wake of World War I were preoccupied with the question of French security. This was to great degree the product of structural circumstances. Germany was France’s immediate neighbor, and France could not take the same wait-and-see approach as Britain. In addition, France had suffered losses in the Great War that were disproportionately larger than those of Germany or Britain. Demographically it was estimated that the German population would in...

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[4] Setting the Table

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pp. 87-116

France in 1924 was still preoccupied with security and terrified of Germany. In the winter, at French insistence, the allies announced that they would not evacuate the first zone of the Rhineland occupation area, centered around Cologne, as scheduled in 1925. The Treaty of Versailles gave them the right to maintain their forces in German territory if Germany did not disarm completely. The allied decision demonstrated the depth of the problem posed by...

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[5] Getting to the Table

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pp. 117-136

An agreement on a deal that created value for both France and Germany, even with the British lending a hand, was hardly foreordained. Simply getting to the table posed its own problems. The French and German governments, both dealing with domestic constraints, exchanged a number of formal notes whose contents could have broken off negotiations. Under pressure from the French...

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[6] Cards on the Table

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pp. 137-161

Having persevered during the difficult prenegotiation phase, the three powers met in Locarno, Switzerland, in October 1925, where they drafted the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee as well as bilateral treaties of arbitration between Germany and its eastern neighbors.1 The final product heavily favored Britain and Germany. Unlike Poincaré, Briand readily conceded to British demands that restricted the scope of the British guarantee to flagrant violations of the Versailles...

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[7] Turning the Tables

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pp. 162-187

The French and Germans found it difficult to capitalize on the new spirit of Locarno following the return to power of the French right. Briand’s leftist coalition was replaced in July 1926 by a conservative government. Briand remained on as foreign minister, but Poincaré returned as premier. The value creating that had prevailed between the two countries gave way to value claiming, making...

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[8] Additional Value

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pp. 188-235

In this chapter, I extend the analysis by telling the story of two groups attempting to transcend what was largely perceived as an intractable conflict. The weaker group, having lost considerable territory through ill-advised military action and now occupied by the stronger group, made gestures toward peace, including the recognition of lost lands and a promise to end violent confrontation. Even though, in many ways, the weaker side had no other options due...

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[9] Searching for Stresemann

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pp. 236-246

There is a reason why scholars of international relations have not devoted significant attention to the 1920s. The maelstrom of the 1930s sucks up all the intellectual oxygen. It is somewhat natural that some, if not the most, cataclysmic events in world history—the Great Depression, the eliminationist Nazi regime, and World War II—attract more interest. Yet there is a lot to learn from the 1920s as..

References

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pp. 247-262

Index

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pp. 263-267