Cover

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Title Page, Copyright

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Contents

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p. vii

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Preface and Acknowledgments

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pp. ix-xiii

When the Soviet Union broke up and revealed the enormity and desperate state of its former bioweapons complex, like many researchers and policy analysts then, I was convinced that a state or terrorist group could readily exploit the expertise available at these former facilities and use it to produce a bioweapon. But after spending extensive time in the former Soviet Union, interacting with former bioweapons scientists supported by government or privately funded research, I found that...

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1 The Bioproliferation Puzzle

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pp. 1-16

When at the end of 2011 scientists at the Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands announced their plan to publish a major finding about the H5N1 bird flu, they set off an unprecedented debate about the usefulness of scientific research with potentially serious security repercussions. The Erasmus team, led by Ron Fouchier, had created a mutant strain of H5N1 that spread more easily among mammals. Although only about six hundred humans are known to have contracted...

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2 The Acquisition and Use of Specialized Knowledge

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pp. 17-36

At a meeting in Geneva in December 2011, former U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton warned of a potential bioterrorism threat, saying, “a crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology.”1 Her statement reiterates a belief common since 2001 and now shared by most policy experts and po liti cal scientists alike: scientifi c knowledge is cumulative, is...

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3 Impediments and Facilitators of Bioweapons Development

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pp. 37-63

The challenges of knowledge creation, transfer, and use, and the interdependence of knowledge reservoirs, discussed in chapter 2, raise two important questions: How can a program create the appropriate conditions to ensure efficient knowledge use? And, what conditions might prevent success? Understanding what factors impede or facilitate knowledge acquisition and successful use has rarely been the focus...

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4 The American Bioweapons Program

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pp. 64-90

After almost three decades of operation, President Richard Nixon unilaterally terminated the U.S. bioweapons program in 1969. Most studies explain the program’s termination by focusing on the weight of outside political and social pressure, and on the program’s inability to produce weapons that met military requirements. Notably, U.S. political and military elites alike were dismayed by how this program was burdened not only by moral concerns but also by uncertainties...

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5 The Soviet Bioweapons Program

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pp. 91-121

When the first American delegation visited the anthrax production plant in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, in 1995, they were struck by the enormity of the place. Spanning a territory of two square kilometers, the plant was composed of more than fifty buildings. The main production building alone was almost two football- field lengths and contained ten 20,000- liter fermentors, each four stories high, capable of producing 300 tons of anthrax a year. The facility housed a unique indoor 300...

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6 Small Bioweapons Programs and the Constraints of Covertness

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pp. 122-143

Achieving covertness in a bioweapons program truly has the character of a double- edged sword. On the one hand, though it can shield an illicit program from outside scrutiny while the program seeks the materials needed to commence its objective, it can also be a powerful impediment to success, as the case of the Soviet bioweapons program demonstrates. Its increased fi nancial burden and its effects on knowledge management can derail a program, even one with a long history...

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7 Preventing Bioweapons Developments

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pp. 144-168

In the case study chapters, we have observed how endogenous and exogenous characteristics of a bioweapons program can facilitate or hinder its development. Although access to material resources is important, it is the combination of organizational, managerial, political, and economic circumstances characterizing a program that ultimately affects its ability to produce and use knowledge, and thus affect the pace and ultimate program output. These case studies also offer,,,

Appendix 1

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pp. 169-174

Appendix 2

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pp. 175-178

Notes

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pp. 179-212

Index

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pp. 213-220