Cover

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Title Page, Copyright

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Contents

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p. vii

List of Tables

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pp. ix-x

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Acknowledgments

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pp. xi-xii

A wise man once told me that I could not survive in this business unless I surrounded myself with a lot of smart and supportive people. I have had the good fortune to come across both over the years, and it is a plea sure to I owe my greatest intellectual debt to John Mearsheimer, who taught me everything I know about being a scholar. He has been a formidable critic, ...

Abbreviations

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p. xiii

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1. Introduction

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pp. 1-19

Western Europe, observed Winston Churchill less than two years after World War II, was “a rubble- heap, a charnel- house, a breeding- ground of pestilence and hate.” Like many of his contemporaries, the former prime minister attributed the continent’s misery to the nation- state system. A region divided into sovereign states animated by “ancient nationalistic feuds” could not remain reliably at...

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2. Explaining International Cooperation

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pp. 20-40

My central argument is that the balance of power largely determines whether and how states cooperate with one another. This chapter presents my balance of power theory of cooperation, paying par tic u lar attention to its assumptions and causal logics. I begin with a brief discussion of power— what it is, why states want it, and what strategies they can adopt to deal with stronger competitors. One of these strategies— balancing—involves cooperating with other relatively weak...

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3. Origins: Heavy-Industry Integration, 1945–1950

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pp. 41-103

On May 9, 1950, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France announced that his government intended to place “French- German production of coal and steel . . . under a joint high authority, within an organization open to the participation of other European nations.” He hoped that an arrangement of this sort would represent the first step toward a “European federation.”1 Later that day, Konrad Adenauer, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, called a press...

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4. Setback: Military Integration, 1950–1954

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pp. 104-167

On June 25, 1950, less than a week after delegates of the Six met in Paris to begin the negotiations that would lead to the creation of the ECSC, North Korea attacked South Korea. Because it was assumed that the Soviets had approved the invasion in advance, western planners feared that events on the peninsula foreshadowed Russian aggression in Europe. The American response was swift, and at the tripartite...

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5. Triumph: Economic Integration, 1955–1957

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pp. 168-226

In the early 1950s, the coal and steel pool was the exception: the Europeans preferred to cooperate rather than establish supranational institutions and integrate their economies.1 Then in May 1955, only months after the French National Assembly had voted down the Europe an army project, the Benelux states called on their neighbors to “make a fresh advance toward Europe an integration” by constructing...

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6. Beyond Postwar Europe

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pp. 227-256

States balance against powerful competitors and in the context of the early cold war this drove France and the Federal Republic to establish the EC. Aware that they confronted an overwhelming opponent and that the Soviet Union derived its strength from a centralized organizational structure in addition to its formidable assets, the Europeans understood that they had to go beyond an alliance...

Index

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pp. 257-265