In this Book

summary
What can the disciplines of political science and economics learn from one another? Political scientists have recently begun to adapt economic theories of exchange, trade, and competition to the study of legislatures, parties, and voting. At the same time, some of the most innovative and influential thinkers in economics have crossed the boundaries of their discipline to explore the classic questions of political science. Competition and Cooperation features six of these path-breaking scholars, all winners of the Nobel Prize for Economics, in a series of conversations with more than a dozen distinguished political scientists. The discussions analyze, adapt, and extend the Nobelists' seminal work, showing how it has carried over into political science and paved the way for fruitful cooperation between the two disciplines. The exchanges span all of the major conceptual legacies of the Nobel laureates: Arrow's formalization of the problems of collective decisions; Buchanan's work on constitutions and his critique of majority rule; Becker's theory of competition among interest groups; North's focus on insecure property rights and transaction costs; Simon's concern with the limits to rationality; and Selten's experimental work on strategic thinking and behavior. As befits any genuine dialogue, the traffic of ideas and experiences runs both ways. The Nobel economists have had a profound impact upon political science, but, in addressing political questions, they have also had to rethink many settled assumptions of economics. The standard image of economic man as a hyper-rational, self-interested creature, acting by and for for himself, bears only a passing resemblance to man as a political animal. Several of the Nobelists featured in this volume have turned instead to the insights of cognitive science and institutional analysis to provide a more recognizable portrait of political life. The reconsideration of rationality and the role of institutions,in economics as in politics, raises the possibility of a shared approach to individual choice and institutional behavior that gives glimmers of a new unity in the social sciences. Competition and Cooperation demonstrates that the most important work in both economics and political science reflects a marriage of the two disciplines.

Table of Contents

restricted access Download Full Book
  1. Cover
  2. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Title page, Copyright, Dedication
  2. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Contents
  2. pp. vii-ix
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Contributors
  2. pp. xi-xii
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Preface
  2. pp. xiii-xiv
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Introduction
  2. James E. Alt, Margaret Levi, Elinor Ostrom
  3. pp. xv-xix
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chapter 1. Kenneth J. Arrow: A Biographical Sketch
  2. pp. 1-3
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Kenneth J. Arrow, Welfare Aggregation, and Progress in Political Theory
  2. Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer
  3. pp. 4-32
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chaos or Equilibrium in Preference and Belief Aggregation
  2. Norman Schofield
  3. pp. 33-50
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Comments on the Commentaries
  2. Kenneth J. Arrow
  3. pp. 51-56
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chapter 2. Herbert A. Simon: A Biographical Sketch
  2. pp. 57-59
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Rationality Redux: Reflections on Herbert A. Simon's Vision of Politics
  2. Robert E. Goodin
  3. pp. 60-84
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Bounded Rationality, Political Insitutions, and the Analysis of Outcomes
  2. Bryan D. Jones
  3. pp. 85-111
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. The Potlatch Between Economics and Political Science
  2. Herbert A. Simon
  3. pp. 112-119
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chapter 3. James M. Buchanan: A Biographical Sketch
  2. pp. 120-122
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Taking Consitutions Seriously: Buchanan's Challenge to Twentieth-Century Political Science
  2. Vincent Ostrom
  3. pp. 123-136
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. James M. Buchanan's Contributions to Public Economics, Political Philosophy, and Political Science
  2. Thomas Schwartz
  3. pp. 137-151
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Response to Ostrom and Schwartz
  2. James M. Buchanan
  3. pp. 152-154
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chapter 4. Gary S. Becker: A Biographical Sketch
  2. pp. 155-157
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Gary S. Becker: An Appreciation, Some Modest Proposals, and a Disciplinary Self-Critique
  2. Ronald Rogowski
  3. pp. 158-169
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Social Capital
  2. Russell Hardin
  3. pp. 170-189
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Comments
  2. Gary S. Becker
  3. pp. 190-196
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chapter 5. Douglass C. North: A Biographical Sketch
  2. pp. 197-199
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Douglass C. North and Institutional Change in Contemporary Developing Countries
  2. Barbara Geddes
  3. pp. 200-227
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Ideology and Professionalism in International Institutions: Insights from the Work of Douglass C. North
  2. Robert O. Keohane
  3. pp. 228-246
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Response to Geddes and Keohane
  2. Douglass C. North
  3. pp. 247-252
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chapter 6. Reinhard Selten: A Biographical Sketch
  2. pp. 253-255
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Game Theory, Structure, and Sequence: The Contributions of Reinhard Selten to Political Analysis
  2. Kenneth A. Shepsle
  3. pp. 256-272
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Identity Choice Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Reflections on Selten's Dualist Methodology
  2. David D. Laitin
  3. pp. 273-302
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Response to Shepsle and Laitin
  2. Reinhard Selten
  3. pp. 303-308
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chapter 7. Discussion of Political Science and Economics: Three Research Programs in Constitutional Political Economy
  2. James M. Buchanan
  3. pp. 309-313
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. In Anticipation of the Marriage of Political and Economic Theory
  2. Douglass C. North
  3. pp. 314-317
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Comments on Remarks of James M. Buchanan and Douglass C. North
  2. Herbert A. Simon
  3. pp. 318-320
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Reflections on Political Science
  2. Kenneth J. Arrow
  3. pp. 321-325
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Remarks on the Methodology of Science: Discovery and Verification
  2. Herbert A. Simon
  3. pp. 326-330
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Chapter 8. Conclusion
  2. Margaret Levi, Elinor Ostrom, James E. Alt
  3. pp. 331-338
  4. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
  1. Index
  2. pp. 339-347
  3. restricted access
    • Download PDF Download
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.