Title Page, Copyright

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Contents

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Acknowledgments

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pp. xi-xiv

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Introduction: Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy

Gyula Klima

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pp. 1-8

It is supposed to be common knowledge in the history of ideas that one of the few medieval philosophical contributions preserved in modern philosophical thought is the idea that mental phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality, their intrinsic directedness toward some...

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Concepts and Meaningin Medieval Philosophy

Stephen Read

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pp. 9-28

The medieval theory of signification underpinned the theory of truth, which in turn fed into a theory of inference. The theory of signification describes generally how words relate to things and how propositions come to mean what they do. But this general description needs a further account of how a particular...

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Mental Language in Aquinas?

Joshua P. Hochschild

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pp. 29-45

It would be anachronistic, at the very least, to attribute to Aquinas a theory of mental language. As historians of philosophy seem to agree, and I will not question, it is only after Aquinas that thinkers elaborated theories of mental language, or of a “language of thought,” with attempts to provide a linguistic...

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Causality and Cognition: An Interpretation of Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet V, q. 14

Martin Pickavé

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pp. 46-80

Among scholars of medieval philosophy Henry of Ghent is well known as a critic of the view (defended, for example, by Thomas Aquinas) according to which intellectual cognition requires so-called intelligible species, that is, cognitive devices that precede the act of the intellective power and that are necessary...

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Two Models of Thinking: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on Occurrent Thoughts

Giorgio Pini

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pp. 81-103

Suppose I am thinking about what it is to be a cat. What sort of activity am I engaging in? What is it to think about something? Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus answered this question in two remarkably different ways. Even though Scotus did not develop his theory of thinking in direct opposition to...

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Thinking About Things: Singular Thought in the Middle Ages

Peter King

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pp. 104-121

In one corner, Socrates. In the other, on the mat, his cat, Felix. Socrates, of course, thinks (correctly) that Felix the Cat is on the mat. But there’s the rub. For Socrates to think that Felix is on the mat, he has to be able to think about Felix, that is, he has to have some sort of cognitive grasp of an individual—and not...

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Singular Terms and Vague Conceptsin Late Medieval Mental Language Theory: Or, the Decline and Fall of Mental Language

Henrik Lagerlund

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pp. 122-140

William Ockham and John Buridan belong to the same late medieval philosophical tradition. What primarily unites this tradition is a shared metaphysical stance, which can be traced at least up to Thomas Hobbes, and which through Hobbes had a profound influence on British philosophy and also on Leibniz...

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Act, Species, and Appearance

Russell L. Friedman

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pp. 141-165

The study of consciousness is without question one of the hottest topics in contemporary philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. Among other issues currently being debated are: whether consciousness even exists; if it does exist, then can we explain it or characterize it; and if we can do...

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Ockham’s Externalism

Claude Panaccio

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pp. 166-185

Externalism in recent philosophy is the idea that the internal states of an agent do not suffice in general to determine the content of what she thinks, or knows or does not know, or the meaning of what she says. Under one guise or another, externalism has been defended by some of the most prominent analytic philosophers...

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Was Adam Wodeham an Internalistor an Externalist?

Elizabeth Karger

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pp. 186-203

Conceiving of the mind as a substance, Adam Wodeham regarded thoughts as accidents within the mind and their contents as fixed independently of things existing outside of it. He also recognized, however, that, in the normal course of nature, our simplest and most basic mental acts, by which we conceive of the...

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How Chatton Changed Ockham’s Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment

Susan Brower-Toland

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pp. 204-234

Recent scholarship has begun to uncover the nature and extent of the reciprocal—and typically adversarial—relationship between William Ockham (d. 1347) and Walter Chatton (d. 1343). We now know, for example, that Chatton, a slightly younger contemporary of Ockham, is both enormously influenced...

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The Nature of Intentional Objects in Nicholas of Autrecourt’s Theory of Knowledge

Christophe Grellard

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pp. 235-250

If we admit that all mental states share a common feature, namely, the feature of being about something, or being directed toward something, then we can describe “intentionality” as this property of aboutness or directedness. But what is this thing that a mental state is about? More precisely, two questions should...

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On the Several Senses of “Intentio” in Buridan

Jack Zupko

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pp. 251-272

What is intentionality? It is a useful concept, but its essence is hard to define, especially if we look at how it has actually been used by philosophers since Greek and Roman antiquity. It behaves like a quality, though it is not always clear what kind of quality it is or what it is a quality of. Sometimes it is specified...

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Mental Representation in Animals and Humans: Some Late Medieval Discussions

Olaf Pluta

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pp. 273-286

In his Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen), Ludwig Wittgenstein makes the following remark about animal thinking:
It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: “they do not think, and that is why they do not...

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The Intersubjective Sameness of MentalConcepts in Late Scholastic Thought

Stephan Meier-Oeser

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pp. 287-322

The short introductory remarks of Aristotle’s De interpretatione, as unimposing as they may appear, have provided the starting point of some of the most intense and long-lasting debates in the history of semantics and epistemology.¹ Quite a number of these discussions are more or less closely related to the...

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Mental Representations and Conceptsin Medieval Philosophy

Gyula Klima

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pp. 323-338

Talking about mental representations and concepts in medieval philosophy, one should probably start with clarifying these terms in the way medieval philosophers used and understood them. However, the phrase repraesentatio mentalis is rarely, if ever, used by medieval philosophers: “mental representation” is...

Bibliography

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pp. 339-354

Contributors

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pp. 355-356

Index

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pp. 357-359