Cover

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pp. 1-1

Title Page, Copyright

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pp. 2-7

Contents

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pp. vii-viii

Tables

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pp. ix-xii

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Preface

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pp. xiii-xviii

The focus of this book is more often than not the "elite," "leadership," or the "regime." A word about these terms is in order. I do not have a fixed notion of the contours of the Egyptian elite; instead the term is used as a kind of shorthand for those occupying the most prominent posts in the state and military apparatus. ...

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Acknowledgments

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pp. xix-xx

This book has gestated for a long period, and the cumulative debts I have incurred have been commensurate with the time spent in preparation. First and foremost it was the opportunity of six years residence in Egypt under the auspices of the American Universities Field Staff that enabled me to assemble the materials for the book. ...

A Note on Transliteration

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p. xxi

A Note on Citations

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p. xxii

Abbreviations

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pp. xxiii-xxiv

Part I: The State's Room for Maneuver

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Chapter One. The Nature of the State and of the Regime

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pp. 3-20

Egypt's geopolitical significance, its overall weight in the important Arab world, and the fact that it was one among a handful of Third World states to move in the 1950s toward a socialist transformation, would in themselves constitute adequate justification for a one-country case study. ...

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Chapter Two. Sovereign State or Link in the Chain of Dependency?

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pp. 21-40

While those who use the concept of dependencia in their analysis of LDCs can hardly be seen as a school there are some basic themes about which there is little disagreement. This view emphasizes that underdevelopment and development are not successive stages in the life of states and societies, ...

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Chapter Three. Demographic Reality and Revolutionary Intent

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pp. 41-54

A revolution, like any other form of politics, is made with people. To some degree Egypt's revolution was made because of too many people. When the monarchy was overthrown in 1952 Egypt's population was approaching 21 million. At that level and under the modes of production prevailing at the time, Egypt's limited resources were already under severe strain. ...

Part 2: The Shifting Fortunes of State Capitalism

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Chapter Four. The Emergence of Egypt's Public Sector

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pp. 57-82

Egypt in the 1950s and the 1960s found itself among a handful of developing countries drawn into state-guided, state-dominated economic growth. One should not forget that among the LDCs Turkey had pioneered in this direction in the 1930s, as had Mexico, without benefit of a Marxian socialist rationale. ...

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Chapter Five. The Public Sector in Crisis

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pp. 83-100

Egypt's gamble on state-led ISI needed time. It could not settle into any kind of comfortable rhythm in the space of one Five-Year Plan, and, in the opinion of cautious Egyptian experts, not even in the space of four such plans. At a minimum what was begun in I960 needed a decade to show results. ...

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Chapter Six. The Public Sector: Performance and Reform

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pp. 101-122

It would be hard to find among the several commentaries on the Egyptian public sector any accolades regarding efficiency in management and production (see esp. Guwaida 1976c; Gritli 1977, pp. 175-218; Hansen and Nashashibi 1975, pp. 255-308). There are two exceptions that in many ways prove the rule. ...

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Chapter Seven. The Open Door to the Triple Alliance

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pp. 123-157

The formal adoption of the "economic open-door policy" (infitah) was not forced upon Egypt by domestic capitalist lobbies nor by Western creditors. Both sources of advice, to the limited extent that they had access to the Sadat regime after 1970, tended to confirm the course upon which the country had already set itself. ...

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Chapter Eight. The Private Sector: Out of the Shadows

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pp. 158-188

Over time the infitah wrought profound changes in the symbols of legitimacy that were forged after 1952. Egypt's foreign enemies had been the Western powers, especially as they acted through NATO or through regional "puppets" like Saudi Arabia. ...

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Chapter Nine. Reprise: Accumulation and Deepening

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pp. 189-204

Developing countries that, like Egypt, adopted state-led ISI as their basic economic strategy, have been quite explicit about what they hoped to achieve. The very fact that public political authorities took the initiative, as opposed to the private sector itself, already says a great deal about their motives which had to do primarily with national economic sovereignty and strength. ...

Part 3: The Impact of Social Engineering

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Chapter Ten. Equity and Inequity without Pain

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pp. 207-231

Capital accumulation and investment have been the central themes of the preceding six chapters, but intimately linked to, and often working at counterpurposes with regime strategies for growth have been policies for social equity and income redistribution. There is no question that Nasserist policies led to far-reaching socio-economic leveling. ...

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Chapter Eleven. State and Class

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pp. 232-262

The existence of a capitalist bourgeoisie in Egypt is a twentieth-century phenomenon. Its indigenous wing took shape in the 1920s and achieved its maximum power after the Second World War. But its economic and political power was never great, paling beside that of foreign interests and hemmed in by a state and regime it could never fully penetrate, no less control. ...

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Chapter Twelve. Land Tenure and Rural Class

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pp. 263-304

Students of contemporary Egyptian society, whatever their ideologies, are nearly at one in attributing great political weight to the agrarian bourgeoisie. This class has been variously named rural middle class, second stratum, kulaks, middle-range landowners, rural capitalist class, and so on. ...

Part 4: Politics without Participation

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Chapter Thirteen. The Arab Socialist Union: Corporatism and Containment

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pp. 307-332

The weight given the economy and state apparatus in this book does not accurately reflect the priorities of the Egyptian elite itself. It was absorbed almost entirely in the hurly-burly of domestic and international politics, leaving to a handful of civilian and occasionally military technocrats the management of the economy. ...

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Chapter Fourteen. Instruments and Processes of Control

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pp. 333-353

If Nasser was able to lay aside his preoccupations with control and preemption only occasionally, his aides, advisors, and clients were seldom able to think beyond questions of short-term personal and regime survival. Nasser's peers from amongst the RCC began to drop away from him in the late 1950s, and increasingly in the 1960s he came to rely upon second-level Free Officers, drawn primarily from military intelligence. ...

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Chapter Fifteen. Controlled Liberalization under Sadat

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pp. 354-388

The marketplace reigns supreme neither in the Egyptian economy nor in the political arena. Sadat and his entourage carefully moved toward mixed systems in both domains and left themselves avenues of retreat toward increased economic statism and political authoritarianism. Real change took place in the economy and the polity in the 1970s, change that cannot be dismissed lightly but that is not irrevocable. ...

Part 5: Regional and International Dependency

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Chapter Sixteen. Socialist and Capitalist Dependency

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pp. 391-405

In examining Egypt's dealings with the superpowers we shall be concerned primarily with those exchanges that have had a direct impact upon the functioning of the economy and upon the decisions that have determined economic growth strategies. The two major avenues of great power influence have come through economic aid and arms sales or transfers. ...

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Chapter Seventeen. The Club of Friends

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pp. 406-422

While the superpowers have competed tenaciously to prevent Egypt from falling irrevocably into the other's camp, lesser creditors have also joined in the geopolitical game. The IMF and the IBRD, on occasion in apparent conformity to US policy objectives, have urged upon Egypt economic reform packages that would foster private enterprise, foreign private investment, and fiscal responsibility. ...

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Conclusion:

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pp. 423-434

The period of socialist transformation in Egypt's economy lasted no more than five years (1961-1966) and that of radical political mobilization at best two (1965-1967). Both processes were top-down, state-inspired and state-led. Few observers would deny that Egypt's leaders in the middle 1960s were able to use the parastatal apparatus effectively ...

Bibliography

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pp. 435-464

Index

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pp. 465-475