Cover

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Title Page, Copyright

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Contents

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pp. v-vi

The Contributors

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pp. vii-viii

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Preface

Steven E. Miller

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pp. ix-xiv

For nearly forty years now, scholars and policymakers have been struggling to cope with the political and military implications of nuclear weapons. The vast and incontestable destructiveness of these weapons has compelled the realization that their use on any large scale would bring untold horrors to both sides in a war. ...

Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence

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pp. 1-2

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The Development of Nuclear Strategy

Bernard Brodie

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pp. 3-22

That concept was put forward almost at once at the beginning of the nuclear age that is still the dominant concept of nuclear strategy—deterrence. It fell to me—few other civilians at the time were interested in military strategy—to publish the first analytical paper on the military implications of nuclear weapons. ...

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Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory

Colin Gray

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pp. 23-56

For good or ill, or even perhaps for some of both, 1979 is almost certain to see the most intensive debate over strategic postural and doctrinal issues since the days of the misprojected missile gap back in 1959-60. SALT II is bringing it all together: the state of the balance, predictions of trends, the relevance (or otherwise) of strategic forces to superpower diplomacy, ...

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Deterrence and Perception

Robert Jervis

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pp. 57-84

In the most elemental sense, deterrence depends on perceptions. But unless people are totally blind, we need not be concerned with the logical point that, if one actor's behavior is to influence another, it must be perceived. ...

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Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank

Barry R. Posen

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pp. 85-112

Could a major East-West conventional war be kept conventional? American policymakers increasingly seem to think so. Recent discussions of such a clash reflect the belief that protracted conventional conflict is possible, if only the West fields sufficient conventional forces and acquires an adequate industrial mobilization base. ...

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The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960

David Alan Rosenberg

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pp. 113-182

On the morning of August 11, 1960, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates met at the White House with President Dwight Eisenhower and top defense officials to present his proposal for coordinating planning for the use of strategic nuclear forces in the massive, simultaneous strike against the "Sino-Soviet bloc" planned for the first twenty-four hours of a war. ...

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U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity

Warner R. Schilling

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pp. 183-214

The United States confronted three important decisions in the late 1960s affecting the state of the Soviet-American strategic nuclear balance: whether to deploy antiballistic missile systems (ABMs), which had the potential of greatly reducing the destruction that a nuclear attack might produce, ...

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U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?

Desmond Ball

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pp. 215-244

On June 16,1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara outlined to a public audience at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor the current U.S. strategy for "the terrible contingency of nuclear war": ...

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The Countervailing Strategy

Walter Slocombe

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pp. 245-254

The fundamental— and unchanged—strategic objective of the United States is to deter aggression that could lead to nuclear war. To achieve strategic nuclear deterrence, three requirements must be met: ...

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The Political Potential of Equivalence

Benjamin S. Lambeth

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pp. 255-272

When the dramatic expansion of Soviet strategic forces first became apparent to Western observers during the latter half of the 1960s, considerable debate arose over the objectives of that effort and its consequences for American security and international stability. ...

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The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis

Barry Blechman, Douglas Hart

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pp. 273-298

Ever since the Eisenhower Administration's policy of massive retaliation failed to stem either the tide of left-leaning nationalist revolutions in the third world or continuing Soviet pressures on Central Europe, mainstream American opinion has tended to view the potential of nuclear weapons to support U.S. foreign policy rather skeptically. ...