Cover

pdf iconDownload PDF
 

Title Page, Copyright

pdf iconDownload PDF
 

read more

Preface

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. v-vi

Progress in philosophy is often hard to detect—perhaps, the cynic will urge, because it is often nonexistent. However, I submit that the volumes of this series demonstrate a steady advance in our understanding of the structure, the function, and the testing and confirmation of scientific theories. ...

Contents

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. vii-viii

I . Glymour's Bootstrapping Theory of Confirmation

read more

"On Testing and Evidence"

Clark Glymour

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 3-26

If we knew the probabilities of all things, good thinking would be apt calculation, and the proper subject of theories of good reasoning would be confined to the artful and efficient assembly of judgments in accordance with the calculus of probabilities. In fact, we know the probabilities of very few things, ...

read more

"Theory Comparison and Relevant Evidence"

Bas C. van Fraassen

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 27-42

What is the main epistemic problem concerning science? I take it that it is the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories, as a basis either for theory acceptance or for practical action. This comparison is clearly a comparison in the light of the available evidence—whatever that means.1 ...

read more

"Bootstrapping without Bootstraps"

Aron Edidin

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 43-54

Clark Glymour has persuasively outlined the advantages of an account of the confirmation of scientific hypotheses in terms of what he calls a bootstrap strategy. The strategey relates sentences in an observational vocabulary to hypotheses in a theoretical vocabulary as follows: Auxiliary hypotheses are found that, when conjoined with the observation-sentences in question, ...

read more

"Explanations of Irrelevance"

Paul Harwich

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 55-66

The singular feature of Clark Glymour's "bootstrap" account of evidence, that which primarily distinguishes it from both Bayesianism and the hypothetico-deductive (henceforth, H-D) method, is that a whole theory is not necessarily confirmed just because one of its parts is: neither evidence for p, nor even the discovery of p, is sufficient to confirm the conjunction p∧q. ...

II. The Bayesian Perspective and the Problem of Old Evidence

read more

"Why Glymour Is a Bayesian"

Roger Rosenkrantz

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 69-98

The central problem his book addresses is to explain how findings in one (observational) vocabulary can evidence propositions stated in a different (theoretical) vocabulary. The solution offered is that a hypothesis is confirmed with respect to a theory by deducing instances of that hypothesis from the evidence and assumptions of the theory, ...

read more

"Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory"

Daniel Garber

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 99-132

The Bayesian framework is intended, at least in part, as a formalization and systematization of the sorts of reasoning that we all carry on at an intuitive level. One of the most attractive features of the Bayesian approach is the apparent ease and elegance with which it can deal with typical strategies for the confirmation of hypotheses in science. ...

read more

"Bayesianism with a Human Face"

Richard Jeffrey

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 133-156

Well, I'm one, for example. But not according to Clark Glymour (1980, pp. 68-69) and some other definers of Bayesianism and personalism, such as Ian Hacking (1967, p. 314) and Isaac Levi (1980, p. xiv). Thus it behooves me to give an explicit account of the species of Bayesianism I espouse (sections 1 and 2) before adding my bit (section 3, with lots of help from my friends) ...

read more

"Three Ways to Give a Probability Assignment a Memory"

Brian Skyrms

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 157-162

Consider a model of learning in which we update our probability assignments by conditionalization; i.e., upon learning S, the probability of not-S is set at zero and the probabilities of statements entailing S are increased by a factor of one over the initial probability of S. ...

III. Evidence and Explanation

read more

"Glymour on Evidence and Explanation"

Bas C. van Fraassen

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 165-176

In Chapter VI of Theory and Evidence (specifically pages 199-203) and in a subsequent paper, Clark Glymour develops an account of scientific explanation to go with his theory of relevant evidence.1 Especially significant for me is his use of these ideas in support of his contention that we can have more reason to believe one theory to be true than another even in cases in which the two theories are empirically equivalent. ...

IV. Historical Case Studies

read more

"Newton's Demonstration of Universal Gravitation and Philosophical Theories of Confirmation"

Ronald Laymon

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 179-200

Philosophers—and critical historians—have not tended to give Newton a sympathetic ear. Probably influenced by the hypothetico-deductive account (henceforth HD) and by its first cousin holism, they have tended to dismiss Newton's remarks as the necessarily ineffectual rationalizations of the paranoid who is unable to accept human limitations and honest criticism. ...

read more

"Realism and Instrumentalism in Pre-Newtonian Astronomy"

Michael R. Gardner

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 201-266

There is supposed to be a problem in the philosophy of science called "realism versus instrumentalism." In the version with which I am concerned, this supposed problem is whether scientific theories in general are put forward as true, or whether they are put forward as untrue but nonetheless convenient devices for the prediction (and retrodiction) of observable phenomena. ...

V. Some Alternative Views on Testing Theories

read more

"Testing Theoretical Hypotheses"

Ronald N. Giere

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 269-298

Philosophers of science concerned with theories and the nature of evidence tend currently to fall into several only partially overlapping groups. One group follows its logical empiricist ancestors at least to the extent of believing that there is a "logic" in the relation between theories and evidence. ...

read more

"The Deductive Model: Does It Have Instances?"

Henry Kyburg

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 299-312

By the deductive model, I mean the deductive model of scientific inquiry. There are plenty of deductive systems around, of course: arithmetic, number theory, set theory, probability theory, even axiomatizations of scientific theories, for example in physics, in biology, and even in psychology. ...

VI. Testing Particular Theories

read more

"Retrospective vs. Prospective Testing of Aetiological Hypotheses in Freudian Theory"

Adolf Grünbaum

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 315-348

The repression-aetiology of neurotic disorders is the cornerstone of the psychoanalytic theory of unconscious motivations. Repressions are held to be not only the pathogens of the psychoneuroses but also the motives of dream construction, and the causes of various sorts of bungled actions ("parapraxes") in which the subject is normally successful (e.g., slips of the tongue or pen). ...

read more

"Subjectivity in Psychoanalytic Inference: The Nagging Persistence of Wilhelm Fliess's Achensee Question"

Paul E. Meehl

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 349-412

An alternative subtitle to this essay, which my non-Freudian Minnesota colleagues urged upon me, would have been, "Whose mind does the mindreader read?" To motivate discussion of a topic not deemed important by some today, consider the story of the last "Congress" between Freud and Fliess, the rupture of their relationship at Achensee in the summer of 1900—the last time the two men ever met, ...

read more

"Consistency Tests in Estimating the Completeness of the Fossil Record: A Neo-Popperian Approach to Statistical Paleontology"

Paul E. Meehl

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 413-476

Most educated persons today, who have been repeatedly exposed since childhood to pictures of the famous "horse series," are likely to think of it, or of the fossil dinosaurs they have seen in museums, rather than other lines of evidence for the theory of evolution. ...

Author Index

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 477-480

Subject Index

pdf iconDownload PDF

pp. 481-484