Cover

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Title Page, Copyright

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Contents

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pp. v-vi

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Preface

RONALD N. GIERE

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p. vii

Publication of this volume on the origins of logical empiricism to some extent represents an effort on the part of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science to recover its own historical origins. The Center's founder, Herbert Feigl, was a student of Moritz Schlick, the organizing force behind the Vienna Circle. Feigl was one of the signers of the Circle's 1929 manifesto "Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis." He was....

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Introduction: Origins of Logical Empiricism

Alan W. Richardson.

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pp. 1-14

This volume grew out of a workshop on the origins of logical empiricism held in October 1993 under the auspices of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Minnesota. This workshop was dedicated to the idea that the ongoing reappraisal of logical empiricism is an endeavor worthy of being broadened and deepened.1 Thus, a number of leading workers in the history of analytic philosophy, philosophy...

Part I. The Cultural and Philosophical Context

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Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of Aufbau

Peter Galison

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pp. 17-44

Between the end of World War I and the immediate post-World War II period, almost a hundred journals and multiauthored volumes appeared in the German-speaking world with the word Aufbau in their titles. Practically none existed before the end of World War I, and only a handful remained after 1947. Put into a histogram, the journals fall into three spikes: the...

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Overcoming Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger

Michael Friedman

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pp. 45-79

It is well known that Rudolf Carnap (in Carnap 1932e) uses examples from Martin Heidegger as illustrations of metaphysical pseudosentences — including, most famously, the sentence "Nothingness itself nothings [Das Nichts selbst nichtet]" (Heidegger 1929b). It is tempting today for those on both sides — for those who sympathize with Carnap and those who sympathize with Heidegger alike — to view this episode with...

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Neurath against Method

Nancy Cartwright and Jordi Cat

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pp. 80-90

There are two central aspects of Carnap's Aufbau. One is the logical construction of science upwards; the second is the assumption that the foundations of the construction can be epistemologically secure, for science can in principle begin with sense-data reports to which the individual knower has privileged access. Neurath entered the protocolsentence debate with views firmly opposed to both features of Carnap's construction. He...

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The Enlightenment Ambition of Epistemic Utopianism: Otto Neurath's Theory of Science in Historical Perspective

Thomas E. Uebel

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pp. 91-112

The systematic analysis of Otto Neurath's theory of science reveals a thinker who has remained surprisingly topical. After briefly indicating one contemporary relevance of Neurath's "anti-philosophical" program, I will explore the question of how it was possible for Neurath to develop his postpositivist conception of science in the Vienna Circle, the reputed high church of twentieth-century positivism. Neurath's originality cannot...

Part II. Science, Philosophy, and Scientific Philosophy

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Relativity, Eindeutigkeit, and Monomorphism: Rudolf Carnap and the Development of the Categoricity Concept in Formal Semantics

Don Howard

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pp. 115-164

The following essay treats several topics. In part, it is concerned with a crucial moment in the development of Rudolf Carnap's constructionist program, which culminated in the publication of Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap 1928a). This moment is Catnap's elucidation of the notion of "monomorphic" axiom systems and concepts in his 1927 essay, "Eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe" (Carnap 1927), a monomorphic axiom system (and, by extension, a monomorphic concept) being one...

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Einstein Agonists: Weyl and Reichenbach on Geometry and the General Theory of Relativity

T. A. Ryckman

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pp. 165-210

I think it is fair to say that most contemporary readers of Hans Reichenbach's works on the epistemology of geometry have not considered them in the scientific context of their origin, that is to say, against the background of activity in the small but vigorous community of general relativists in the decade or so after the inception of the general theory of relativity (GTR) in November 1915. Among these activities, perhaps the best...

Part III. Logic, Mathematics, and Philosophy

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The Philosophy of Mathematics in Early Positivism

Warren Goldfarb

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pp. 213-230

It is commonly held that the philosophy of logic and foundations of mathematics were of central moment in the development of logical positivism. This common wisdom is, of course, correct. It is also commonly held that there was a single logical-positivist doctrine on the nature of logic and mathematics. Here the common wisdom oversimplifies. For although the major positivist writers were in agreement on the general shape of such...

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Carnap: From Logical Syntax to Semantics

Thomas Ricketts

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pp. 231-250

In the mid-1930s Carnap enthusiastically adopted Tarski's technique of truth-definitions to replace purely syntactic treatments of languages in logic. Henceforth, Carnap will develop semantics as the central part of logic to serve the ends previously served by logical syntax. Carnap's move from syntax to semantics may appear to some contemporary eyes to mark a dramatic change of viewpoint. In agreement with Richard Creath, I shall...

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Languages without Logic

Richard Creath

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pp. 251-266

In the last few years several philosophers have examined the sense in which Carnap's The Logical Syntax of Language (1937 [1934]) (hereafter LSL) is really syntax. They have concluded, for the most part, that Carnap's syntax is really semantics or at least that the difference between what Carnap provides and a full-blown semantics would be infinitesimal were....

Part IV. Experience, Empirical Knowledge, and Empiricism

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Postscript to Protocols: Reflections on Empiricism

Thomas Oberdan

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pp. 269-291

The perennial rivalry between foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies has frequently led philosophers to recall the protocol-sentence controversy in the Vienna Circle as a seminal episode in the development of analytic thought. According to the conventional wisdom current just a few years ago, the dispute arose when the physicalists (including Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Carl Hempel) repudiated the Circle's traditional foundationalist...

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Conceptual Knowledge and Intuitive Experience: Schlick's Dilemma

Joia Lewis TVirner

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pp. 292-308

A number of scholars have recently found it increasingly difficult to locate the so-called received view in the original work of the Vienna Circle philosophers. Honest examinations of the written work of Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath, for example, fail to show unbending allegiance to the picture of triumphantly verified scientific claims standing on unchallenged...

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From Epistemology to the Logic of Science: Carnap's Philosophy of Empirical Knowledge in the 1930s

Alan W. Richardson

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pp. 309-332

This essay takes its title from a paper that Rudolf Carnap gave at the 1935 Paris Congress for the Unity of Science. In that paper Carnap (1936a) invited the participants in the congress to view scientific philosophy as having entered a third stage. The first stage of scientific philosophy was the rejection of metaphysics, "the transition from speculative philosophy to epistemology" (ibid., 36). The second stage was the rejection...

Part V. Afterword

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From Wissenschaftliche Philosophie to Philosophy of Science

Ronald N. Giere

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pp. 335-354

Most current research on the origins of logical empiricism deals with developments before 1938. This is appropriate because that year marks the bitter end of scientific philosophy in Europe. With the Anschluss in March 1938, Austria ceased to exist as a separate nation and Czechoslovakia was threatened. There was no place left in the German-speaking world for the scientific philosophers. By the end of 1938, almost everyone who was going...

Bibliography

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pp. 355-378

Contributors

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pp. 379-382

Index of Authors

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pp. 383-386

Index of Subjects

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pp. 387-392