Cover

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Title Page, Series Page, Copyright Page, Dedication

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Contents

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p. vii

List of Maps

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pp. ix-x

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Preface

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pp. xi-xiv

On the afternoon of 9 November 1989, I boarded a plane on a longplanned journey to West Berlin. I was going with a group of graduate students from Harvard and Stanford for ten days on a program sponsored by the city of West Berlin. In an effort to maintain the U.S. commitment to West Berlin, the city paid for the program every year to bring “up and coming” Americans to West Berlin. At the time, I was a pre-doctoral fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School...

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Acknowledgments

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pp. xv-xviii

I am grateful to the institutions and colleagues who have helped me over the years of work on this book. I want to thank the institutions who have generously supported my research and writing: the Harriman Institute of Columbia University, the Nuclear History Program, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Social Science Research Council’s Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies at the F...

Abbreviations

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pp. xix-xx

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Introduction: The Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations in the Early Cold War

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pp. 1-11

The two states that emerged from the defeated Germany were central to the development of the cold war. Rapidly evolving from defeated objects of Four Power policy, the two Germanys became important actors in their own right on the front line of the cold war. Both superpowers initially treated their part of Germany as war booty to be plundered and kept weak, but as the cold war developed, they would each come to see their part of Germany as an essential ally whose needs were intertwined with their own...

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Chapter One: 1953 Soviet–East German Relations and Power Struggles in Moscow and Berlin

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pp. 12-48

Our story begins with the pivotal six months from Stalin’s death in March to the East German leaders’ official visit to Moscow in August 1953. The developments in these months in Soviet policy vis-a` -vis the GDR and in East German and Soviet domestic politics set the stage for much of the remainder of the GDR’s existence. This chapter will introduce the key dynamics and issues in Soviet–East German relations to be examined in this book: (1...

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Chapter Two: 1956–1958 Soviet and East German Policy Debates in the Wake of the Twentieth Party Congress

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pp. 49-95

Prior to the GDR uprising and Beria’s ouster, the Soviet leadership backed a more accommodating, gradual form of socialism in the GDR, which might have led to different developments in the GDR and in Germany as a whole than in fact took place. This chain of events occurred again in 1956 in the aftermath of the CPSU Twentieth Congress and Khrushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin. Just as the relaxation of policies in the GDR in 1953 encouraged a popular uprising, so the de- Stalinization policies of Khrushchev...

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Chapter Three: 1958–1960 Khrushchev Takes on the West in the Berlin Crisis

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pp. 96-138

A bold initiative by Khrushchev and the reaction it provoked again takes center stage in this chapter. Yet Khrushchev’s initiation of the Berlin Crisis was very different from his de-Stalinization campaign and emphasis on peaceful coexistence at the Twentieth Congress described in the previous chapter. Khrushchev’s accommodating style toward the West became coercive in the fall of 1958. How and why did Khrushchev change his approach, and why did he decide to focus his foreign policy on Berlin and Germany? What was the role of Ulbricht in the crisis? This chapter and the next...

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Chapter Four: 1960–1961 Ulbricht, Khrushchev, and the Berlin Wall

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pp. 139-223

Khrushchev’s procrastination in transferring to the GDR control over the access routes to West Berlin was a source of great frustration for Ulbricht. After watching from the sidelines for almost two years as Khrushchev negotiated with the West, Ulbricht activated his own Berlin policy in the fall of 1960. Consequently, Khrushchev found himself with narrowing room to maneuver between Western intransigence and Ulbricht’s unilateral moves to close the border in Berlin. In generating the Berlin Crisis, Khrushchev...

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Conclusion

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pp. 224-234

This book has examined an important and insufficiently studied aspect of the cold war: Moscow’s complicated alliance relations, focusing on East Berlin. It was not just Washington that experienced difficulties controlling its allies; Moscow did as well. This work has portrayed three cases of the East German leadership resisting, hindering, and changing Soviet policies. In 1953 Ulbricht resisted the Soviet New Course and ousted its East German proponents Zaisser and Herrnstadt. In 1956 and 1957 Ulbricht countered the more liberal view of the implications of the Soviet Twentieth Congress and the Hungarian uprising for the GDR, and he removed from...

Notes

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pp. 235-310

Note on Sources

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pp. 311-314

Bibliography

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pp. 315-336

Index

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pp. 337-346