Cover

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Title Page, Copyright

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pp. i-iv

Contents

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pp. v-viii

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Preface

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pp. ix-xii

...With that knowledge, and little else in mind, I wrote an editorial that appeared on June 25, 1990, urging the United States to “help the Koreas in from the cold” by coaxing them into military disengagement and diplomatic reengagement. “North Korea may accept international nuclear safeguards and is proposing new...

Abbreviations

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pp. xiii-xvi

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1. Uncooperative America

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pp. 3-14

...credible. Yet that orthodoxy ignores another source of foreign policy failure— American unwillingness to cooperate with strangers. In a number of recent cases the United States has tried threats to get its way when promises seemed more likely to succeed. Whether with Russia or Japan, with Cuba or the Palestinians, we...

Part I. Coercion Fails

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2. The Bush Deadlock Machine

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pp. 17-51

...that brief flirtation with conciliation, it opted for coercion. Wary of trying to satisfy Pyongyang’s wants in return for halting and rolling back its nuclear arms program, Washington did not attempt to engage in diplomatic give-and-take. Instead, it...

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3. The Clinton Administration Ties Itself in Knots

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pp. 52-89

...misspoke, officials were trying to give priority to a more ascertainable, more urgent, and more achievable aim: to keep North Korea from producing more plutonium for bomb-making. By that time, too, a draft National Intelligence Estimate was...

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4. A "Better Than Ever" Chance of Misestimation

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pp. 90-123

...Inside the government, it had a muffled impact. One reason for the official reception is that without much hard data the intelligence community was sharply divided about North Korea’s nuclear past. Another is that the assessment did not point to a compelling policy conclusion. “I always found the differences more interesting...

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5. Deadlock

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pp. 124-128

...Korea comply with the I.A.E.A. as a precondition for talks, then entered into talks with extreme reluctance. Even when it engaged in negotiations, it was unwilling to specify what it would give North Korea in return for abandoning nuclear-arming. When...

Part II. Cooperation Succeeds

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6. Open Covenants, Privately Arrived At

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pp. 131-167

...occupation troops, is an American citizen and a Korean patriot. Like many Koreans of his generation, he has kin on both sides of the 38th Parallel. Also like many prominent Koreans of his generation, he attended university in the United States. Unlike them, he stayed on. By emigrating, he avoided swearing allegiance...

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7. Getting to Yes

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pp. 168-204

...crisis. Its turnaround was prompted by an awareness, brought home by the June 16 warning briefing, of how imminent war seemed in mid-June. The close call chastened the few officials who were aware of it—in parts of the Pentagon, on the negotiating team, and at the very top of the administration. Going to “the brink of disaster,”...

Part III. Conclusions

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8. Nuclear Diplomacy in the News - An Untold Story

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pp. 207-228

...Nuclear diplomacy with North Korea was largely covered as a case of crime and punishment. North Korea was portrayed as an outlaw state whose misdeeds warranted economic sanctions. Suspicions of its noncompliance with the Nonproliferation...

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9. The Politics of Discouragement

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pp. 229-243

...ammunition against hawks at home or in South Korea, were little more than bluff at best, counterproductive at worst. North Korea bristled at every threat, becoming more intransigent instead of more pliable. The result was diplomatic deadlock. North Korea needed little reminder of the history of American nuclear...

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10. Why Won't America Cooperate?

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pp. 244-254

...of North Korea for policy-makers. Even when their grip on policy-makers’ minds began to loosen by the fall of 1993, the four shared images still retained their hold over manyvocal members of the foreign policyestablishmen t who influenced the domestic politics of nuclear diplomacyin the United States. Establishment opposition...

Appendixes

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pp. 255-264

Notes

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pp. 265-306

Index

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pp. 307-321