In this Book

Moral Psychology
summary
Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of <I>Moral Psychology</I> offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga -- consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions.<B>Contributors</B>Roy F. Baumeister, Tim Bayne, Gunnar Björnsson, C. Daryl Cameron, Hanah A. Chapman, William A. Cunningham, Patricia S. Churchland, Christopher G. Coutlee, Daniel C. Dennett, Ellen E. Furlong, Michael S. Gazzaniga, Patrick Haggard, Brian Hare, Lasana T. Harris, John-Dylan Haynes, Richard Holton, Scott A. Huettel, Robert Kane, Victoria K. Lee, Neil Levy, Alfred R. Mele, Christian Miller, Erman Misirlisoy, P. Read Montague, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, William T. Newsome, B. Keith Payne, Derk Pereboom, Adina L. Roskies, Laurie R. Santos, Timothy Schroeder, Michael N. Shadlen, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sripada, Christopher L. Suhler, Manuel Vargas, Gideon Yaffe

Table of Contents

  1. Cover
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  1. Title Page, Copyright Page
  2. pp. i-vi
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  1. Contents
  2. pp. vii-x
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  1. Acknowledgments
  2. pp. xi-xii
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  1. Introduction
  2. pp. xiii-xviii
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  1. 1: Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences
  2. Eddy Nahmias
  3. pp. 1-26
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  1. 1.1: Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing
  2. Gunnar Björnsson and Derk Pereboom
  3. pp. 27-36
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  1. 1.2: A Neuroscientific Account of the Human Will
  2. Erman Misirlisoy and Patrick Haggard
  3. pp. 37-42
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  1. 1.3: Response to Misirlisoy and Haggard and to Bjornsson and Pereboom
  2. Eddy Nahmias
  3. pp. 43-58
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  1. 2: Mental Life and Responsibility in Real Time with a Determined Brain
  2. Michael S. Gazzaniga
  3. pp. 59-74
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  1. 2.1: Seduced by Tradition
  2. Daniel C. Dennett
  3. pp. 75-80
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  1. 2.2: Neuroscience, Explanation, and the Problem of Free Will
  2. William T. Newsome
  3. pp. 81-96
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  1. 2.3: Response
  2. Michael S. Gazzaniga
  3. pp. 97-102
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  1. 3. Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?
  2. Adina L. Roskies
  3. pp. 103-126
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  1. 3.1: Free Will, Mechanism, and Determinism: Comments on Roskles, "Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?”
  2. Robert Kane
  3. pp. 127-138
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  1. 3.2: Comments on Adina Roskles, “Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?”
  2. Michael N. Shadlen
  3. pp. 139-150
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  1. 3.3: Response to Commentators
  2. Adina L. Roskies
  3. pp. 151-156
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  1. 4: The Neural Code for Intentions in the Human Brain
  2. John-Dylan Haynes
  3. pp. 157-176
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  1. 4.1: Neural Decoding and Human Freedom
  2. Tim Bayne
  3. pp. 177-182
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  1. 4.2: Short-Term and Long-Term Intentions in Psychological Theory, Neurotechnology, and Free Will
  2. Timothy Schroeder
  3. pp. 183-190
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  1. 4.3: Reply to Schroeder and Bayne
  2. John-Dylan Haynes
  3. pp. 191-194
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  1. 5. Free Will and Substance Dualism
  2. Alfred R. Mele
  3. pp. 195-208
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  1. 5.1: Dualism, Libertarianism, and Scientific Skepticism about Free Will
  2. Thomas Nadelhoffer
  3. pp. 209-216
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  1. 5.2: Reconsidering Scientific Threats to Free Will
  2. Manuel Vargas
  3. pp. 217-226
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  1. 5.3: Reply to Nadelhoffer and Vargas
  2. Alfred R. Mele
  3. pp. 227-234
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  1. 6: Constructing a Scientific Theory of Free Will
  2. Roy F. Baumeister
  3. pp. 235-256
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  1. 6.1: Hold Off on the Definitions: Comments on Baumeister
  2. Richard Holton
  3. pp. 257-264
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  1. 6.2: Free Will Worth Having and the Intentional Control of Behavior
  2. B. Keith Payne and C. Daryl Cameron
  3. pp. 265-270
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  1. 6.3: Grateful Responses to Thoughtful Comments by Holton, Payne, and Cameron
  2. Roy F. Baumeister
  3. pp. 271-278
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  1. 7: The Freedom to Choose and Drug Addiction
  2. P. Read Montague
  3. pp. 279-286
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  1. 7.1 Dopamine Dysfunction and Addict Responsibility
  2. Gideon Yaffe
  3. pp. 287-294
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  1. 7.2: The Second Hit in Addiction
  2. Chandra Sripada
  3. pp. 295-304
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  1. 7.3: Responses to Yaffe and Sripada
  2. P. Read Montague
  3. pp. 305-308
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  1. 8: Agency and Control
  2. Patricia S. Churchland and Christopher L. Suhler
  3. pp. 309-326
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  1. 8.1: Rules, Rewards, and Responsibility
  2. Christopher G. Coutlee and Scott A. Huettel
  3. pp. 327-334
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  1. 8.2: Consciousness Matters
  2. Neil Levy
  3. pp. 335-340
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  1. 8.3: Responses
  2. Patricia S. Churchland and Christopher L. Suhler
  3. pp. 341-346
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  1. 9: Evolutionary Insights into the Nature of Choice
  2. Ellen E. Furlong and Laurie R. Santos
  3. pp. 347-360
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  1. 9.1: Is Human Free Will Prisoner to Primate, Ape, and Hominin Preferences and Biases?
  2. Brian Hare
  3. pp. 361-366
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  1. 9.2: Furlong and Santos on Desire and Choice
  2. Christian B. Miller
  3. pp. 367-374
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  1. 9.3: Response to Miller and Hare
  2. Ellen E. Furlong and Laurie R. Santos
  3. pp. 375-380
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  1. 10: A Social Perspective on Debates about Free Will
  2. Victoria K. Lee and Lasana T. Harris
  3. pp. 381-396
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  1. 10.1: Social Groups
  2. Hanah A. Chapman and William A. Cunningham
  3. pp. 397-402
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  1. 10.2 Social Explanations and the Free Will Problem
  2. Manuel Vargas
  3. pp. 403-412
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  1. 10.3: Extreme Group Membership Frames the Debate
  2. Victoria K. Lee and Lasana T. Harris
  3. pp. 413-418
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  1. References
  2. pp. 419-458
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  1. Contributors
  2. pp. 459-460
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  1. Index
  2. pp. 461-474
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