In this Book

Cornell University Press
summary

The liberalization of transatlantic trade relations since the Great Depression is one of the key developments in the global political economy of the last hundred years. This period has seen the negotiated reduction of both tariffs and nontariff barriers among developed countries, which allowed for the rapid expansion of trade flows, a driving force of economic globalization. In Protection for Exporters, Andreas Dür provides a novel explanation for this phenomenon that stresses the role of societal interests in shaping trade politics. He argues that exporters lobby more in reaction to losses of foreign market access than in pursuit of opportunities, thus providing a rationale for periods of acceleration and slowdown in the pace of liberalization.

Dür also presents hypotheses about the form in which protection for exporters is provided (preferential or nonpreferential) and the balance of concessions that is exchanged in trade negotiations. Protection for Exporters includes case studies of major developments in international trade relations, such as the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in the 1930s, the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the 1940s, the Kennedy Round in the 1960s, the debate over Fortress Europe in the 1980s, and U.S.-European competition over access to emerging markets in the early 2000s.

Dür's rigorous argument and systematic empirical analyses not only explain transatlantic trade relations but also allow for a better understanding of the dynamics of international economic relations.

Table of Contents

  1. Cover
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  1. Title Page, Copyright, Dedication
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  1. Contents
  2. pp. vii-viii
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  1. Tables and Figures
  2. pp. ix-x
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  1. Preface and Acknowledgments
  2. pp. xi-xiv
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  1. Abbreviations
  2. pp. xv-xvi
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  1. Introduction
  2. pp. 1-14
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  1. 1. Protection for Exporters
  2. pp. 15-49
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  1. 2. Imperial Preference and the U.S. Reaction, 1932-1947
  2. pp. 50-82
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  1. 3. Deadlock in Transatlantic Trade Negotiations, 1948-1957
  2. pp. 83-100
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  1. 4. The European Economic Community, Discrimination, and Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1958-1963
  2. pp. 101-130
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  1. 5. The First Enlargement of the European Community and the U.S. Reaction
  2. pp. 131-158
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  1. 6. The Single Market Programme and Transatlantic Trade Policies in the 1980s
  2. pp. 159-184
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  1. 7. Competition between the European Union and the United States for Markets, 1995-2010
  2. pp. 185-210
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  1. Conclusion
  2. pp. 211-222
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  1. References
  2. pp. 223-240
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  1. Index
  2. pp. 241-246
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