Action and Character According to Aristotle
Publication Year: 2013
Published by: The Catholic University of America Press
Title Page, Copyright Page
I have tried in this book to get to the bottom of some issues in Aristotle’s theory of human action and his philosophical psychology, but my original reason for looking at a good number of these issues in Aristotle was to resolve—or, at least, to shed some light upon—related issues in contemporary ethics and in the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. ...
1. Logic, Perception, and the Practical Syllogism
Aristotle tells us any number of times that ethics does not admit of the methods of analysis proper to the sciences.1 This is largely due to the fact that the character of one’s moral acts depends directly upon how one understands what one is doing. ...
2. The “Physical” Structure of the Human Act
We established in chapter 1 that the proper subject matter of ethics is the singular human act and that, as such, it ought not to be conceived of as part of a syllogism such as those studied in Prior analytics (the syllogistic). We begin now the task proper of analyzing singular human acts, showing first of all, in section I, how Aristotle treats them in his Physics, ...
3. Internal Articulation and Force
In chapter 1, I argued that the standard passages on the practical syllogism have more to do with the material of the practical than is commonly thought. This turned our attention to the singular human act and so, in chapter 2, we considered the human act according to the model of a physical movement proceeding toward a single object ...
4. The Constituents of Human Action and Ignorance Thereof
We continue in this chapter to explore the perceptual realm of practical reason, in contrast with what I referred to in chapter 1 as the realm of the syllogistic, whose coin is the universal term. So, as in chapter 2, we are concerned here with the type of human act which is analyzable straightforwardly as an Aristotelian movement (or κίνησις). ...
5. Intelligibility and the Per Se
In the first half of this book (chapters 1 through 4), we treated human acts primarily as acts, considering their singular nature, their structure, and the factors that shape them. Not much of that treatment was explicitly moral in content. A voluntary act as such, with an object, an end, using a certain instrument, in a certain way, etc., ...
6. Action, Φρόνησις, and Pleasure
In chapter 5, especially in sections III and IV, we were concerned with an important aspect of Aristotle’s philosophical psychology of action: the way in which behaving virtuously is very often a matter of taking aim at the target (the mean) determined by right reason. ...
7. Φρόνησις and the Φρόνιμος
A major impediment to understanding the character type called by Aristotle the φρόνιμος is the sheer difficulty of the first chapter of the eighth book of the Eudemian Ethics.1 The difficulty stems from what has to be called the weirdness of Aristotle’s argument. ...
8. Some Other Character Types
Aristotle employs in his ethical writings a veritable menagerie of character types, most of whom we have already met. They include the φρόνιμος (the practically wise man), the σπουδαῖος (the good man), the ἀκρατής (the incontinent man), the ἀκόλαστος (the depraved man), and the ἐγκρατής (the self-constrained man). ...
I stated in the Introduction that the overall movement of this book is from the consideration of individual acts to the consideration of ethics itself and ethical character types. The earlier chapters (chapters 1 through 4) had to do primarily with acts, the later (chapters 5 through 8) with matters of larger scope. ...
Appendix 1: On the Text of Metaph. ix, 6, 1048b18–35
Appendix 2: Eudemian Ethics ii,6–9
Index of Names
Index of Aristotelian Passages Cited
Index of Subjects
Page Count: 349
Publication Year: 2013
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