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Feeling Extended

Sociality as Extended Body-Becoming-Mind

Douglas Robinson

Publication Year: 2013

A new view of the extended mind thesis argues that a stark binary opposition between really extending and seeming to extend oversimplifies the issue.

Published by: The MIT Press


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pp. 1-1

Title PAge, Copyright

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pp. 2-5


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pp. v-vi


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pp. vii-viii

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pp. 1-30

The extended-mind thesis (EMT), generally attributed to Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998), is the notion that in specific kinds of mind-body-world interaction there emerges an extended mind or extended cognitive system that doesn’t just use but incorporates the pencils, paper, computers,...

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1. Inside Out

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pp. 31-66

We begin with the primary claim of the extended-mind thesis (EMT): that mind extends to incorporate what Sterelny (2004) calls the “ epistemic artifacts ” that we use — things like computers and workspaces. This extension of mind to incorporate inanimate things is not the core of the extended-body-becoming-mind thesis that I seek to flesh out in this book, ...

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2. Language as Cognitive Labels

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pp. 67-84

Although I don ’ t join Andy Clark in believing that mind “ literally ” (whatever that might mean) extends to tools and other epistemic artifacts, there are some important ways in which the feeling that it does — extended mind as quale — enhances our cognitive processes. Since the claim that mind does indeed extend to epistemic artifacts is the core of the EMT, it may seem as...

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3. Language as Conative Force

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pp. 85-118

In chapter 2, language consisted of verbal labels that help us organize our experience cognitively, especially understood in terms of the transcranial transferability of those labels and their transformative cognitive effect on each individual’s understanding of the world. As I began to suggest in the introduction, however, this is an extremely narrow conception of language...

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4. Qualia as Interpretants

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pp. 119-146

Daniel Dennett (1988, 1991: 368 – 411) famously proposes that we “ quine ” (deny the existence of) qualia: to his mind they are mere fleeting figments or fictions that have no place in a properly materialist explanation of consciousness. This is a radical, some would say excessive, solution to what has been called the explanatory gap between materialism and qualia...

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5. Empathy, Face, and Ritual

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pp. 147-176

Can I really read your mind? Does body-becoming-mind really extend in social interactions, so that you and are part of the same organism? In the terms I offered at the end of chapter 3, do we really have access to something like the indirect speech acts other people perform for and upon us? Are qualia actually shared, as I wanted to believe in chapter 4? ...

Appendix: Liar-Paradox Monism

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pp. 177-206


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pp. 207-224


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pp. 225-248


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pp. 249-256

E-ISBN-13: 9780262314909
E-ISBN-10: 0262314908
Print-ISBN-13: 9780262019477

Page Count: 264
Publication Year: 2013

OCLC Number: 857467676
MUSE Marc Record: Download for Feeling Extended

Research Areas


Subject Headings

  • Externalism (Philosophy of mind).
  • Philosophy of mind.
  • Cognition -- Philosophy.
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