Cover

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pp. 1-1

Title Page, Copyright Page

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pp. 2-7

Contents

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pp. vii-viii

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Preface

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pp. ix-xiii

Afew years ago, in a fit of optimism, I sought to develop in a single book certain new thoughts I had conceived on the reconciliation of reason and religion. But the manuscript I completed will remain unpublished, as it turned out to be impossible to do well between two covers all that I had in mind to do. ...

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1. On Religion

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pp. 1-38

A rather large concept, which contributes its color to every part of the map whose configurations we are seeking to discern, is the concept of religion. Because of its pervasiveness in philosophy of religion, a book on prolegomena to inquiry in that field might be expected to have something to say about this concept. Indeed, a careful analysis would seem warranted. ...

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2. On Belief

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pp. 39-74

Having clarified “religion” as far as we have, we are closer to being in a position to tackle the ideas of religious belief and a generalized religious disbelief. Philosophers of religion are obviously very interested in the former attitude; one could go on for pages listing the titles referring to it. There is less mention of the latter, but clearly it is ...

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3. On Religious Belief and Religious Disbelief

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pp. 75-94

At the beginning of Chapter 2 I spoke of wishing to color in the borders of the discussion by considering the “outermost” responses to religious claims—religious belief and religious disbelief—before analyzing other responses falling between them. But then we saw how even before that, we needed to become better acquainted with the belief element those opposites have in common. ...

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4. On Religious Skepticism

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pp. 95-105

Once or twice already I have mentioned that there are responses to religious claims which fall between (propositional) belief and disbelief. The most obvious of these is skepticism. Everyone knows both that there are religious believers and disbelievers and that there are religious skeptics, and also that skeptics lack precisely what the believers and disbelievers possess: where ...

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5. On Religious Faith (I)

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pp. 106-126

It might be thought that, having already dealt with matters of belief and of religious belief, this book requires no chapter on religious faith—let alone two! Most philosophers, influenced by common interpretations of such notable figures as Aquinas and Kierkegaard, or else by the theological habits of the often highly doctrinal forms of religion most familiar to them, have held that religious faith is (propositional) religious ...

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6. On Religious Faith (II)

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pp. 127-166

The central idea of this chapter is that of religious faith without propositional religious belief. Let it be emphasized immediately that in supporting this idea I am not arguing that someone could have religious faith without any beliefs whatever, or that there are no particular beliefs (concerning value, say) that are necessarily possessed by one who has faith, but only that it is possible to have such faith without religious belief. ...

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7. On the Aims of Philosophy of Religion

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pp. 167-194

Our investigations in previous chapters of the nature of religion, belief, religious belief and disbelief, religious skepticism, and religious faith were undertaken not just for their own sake but also because of the larger aims that philosophers seek to carry out in connection with such phenomena, the correct development and pursuit of which are facilitated by a proper understanding of them. But what are these aims? ...

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8. On Principles of Evaluation in Philosophy of Religion

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pp. 195-221

In this chapter I undertake an investigation of how best to pursue some of the aims discussed in the previous one. My focus is on evaluative aims, and, even more narrowly, on the evaluation of various actual and possible responses to religious claims—believing, faith-full, purely skeptical, and disbelieving1—which the goal of determining whether religious practice is justified requires philosophers to examine. ...

Index

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pp. 223-226