In this Book

buy this book Buy This Book in Print
summary
Unlike most other emerging South American democracies, Venezuela has not succumbed to a successful military coup d'état during four decades of democratic rule. What drives armed forces to follow the orders of elected leaders? And how do emerging democracies gain that control over their military establishments? Harold Trinkunas answers these questions in an examination of Venezuela's transition to democracy following military rule and its attempts to institutionalize civilian control of the military over the past sixty years, a period that included three regime changes. Trinkunas first focuses on the strategic choices democratizers make about the military and how these affect the internal civil-military balance of power in a new regime. He then analyzes a regime's capacity to institutionalize civilian control, looking specifically at Venezuela's failures and successes in this arena during three periods of intense change: the October revolution (1945@-48), the Pact of Punto Fijo period (1958@-98), and the Fifth Republic under President Hugo Chávez (1998 to the present). Placing Venezuela in comparative perspective with Argentina, Chile, and Spain, Trinkunas identifies the bureaucratic mechanisms democracies need in order to sustain civilian authority over the armed forces. Unlike most other South American democracies, Venezuela has not succumbed to military takeover during its six decades of democratic rule. Trinkunas examines Venezuela's transition to democracy following military rule and its failures and successes at attempts to institutionalize civilian control of its military over the past sixty years, a period that included three regime changes. He argues that current president Hugo Chavez has begun to deliberately dismantle Venezuela's institutions of civilian control of the armed forces. He also puts Venezuela in a comparative perspective against democratization processes in other countries, including Chile, Argentina, and Spain. Trinkunas examines Venezuela's transition to democracy following military rule and its attempts to institutionalize civilian control of the military over the past sixty years, a period that included three regime changes. Placing Venezuela in comparative perspective with Argentina, Chile, and Spain, Trinkunas identifies the bureaucratic mechanisms democracies need in order to sustain civilian authority over the armed forces. Unlike most other emerging South American democracies, Venezuela has not succumbed to a successful military coup d'état during four decades of democratic rule. What drives armed forces to follow the orders of elected leaders? And how do emerging democracies gain that control over their military establishments? Harold Trinkunas answers these questions in an examination of Venezuela's transition to democracy following military rule and its attempts to institutionalize civilian control of the military over the past sixty years, a period that included three regime changes. Trinkunas first focuses on the strategic choices democratizers make about the military and how these affect the internal civil-military balance of power in a new regime. He then analyzes a regime's capacity to institutionalize civilian control, looking specifically at Venezuela's failures and successes in this arena during three periods of intense change: the October revolution (1945–48), the Pact of Punto Fijo period (1958–98), and the Fifth Republic under President Hugo Chávez (1998 to the present). Placing Venezuela in comparative perspective with Argentina, Chile, and Spain, Trinkunas identifies the bureaucratic mechanisms democracies need in order to sustain civilian authority over the armed forces.

Table of Contents

  1. Cover
  2. pp. 1-1
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Title Page, Copyright
  2. pp. 2-7
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Contents
  2. pp. vii-11
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Acknowledgments
  2. pp. xi-xii
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Abbreviations
  2. pp. xiii-15
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 1. Democracy and Civilian Control of the Armed Forces: Venezuela in Comparative Perspective
  2. pp. 1-26
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 2. A Lost Opportunity: The Failure of Democratization in Venezuela, 1945–1948
  2. pp. 27-61
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 3. The 1958 Transition to Democracy in Venezuela: Strategizing Civilian Control
  2. pp. 62-109
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 4. Statecraft and Military Subordination in Venezuela, 1959–1973
  2. pp. 110-155
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 5. Civilian Control under Fire: Resisting Challenges from the Military in Venezuela, 1992
  2. pp. 156-205
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 6. Revolutionizing Civil-Military Relations? Hugo Chávez and the Fifth Republic in Venezuela, 1998–2004
  2. pp. 206-233
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. 7. Assessing the Relationship between Civilian Control of the Military and the Consolidation of Democracy
  2. pp. 234-264
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Notes
  2. pp. 265-268
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. References
  2. pp. 269-288
  3. restricted access Download |
  1. Index
  2. pp. 289-297
  3. restricted access Download |

Additional Information

ISBN
9781469603643
Related ISBN
9780807829820
MARC Record
OCLC
69679306
Pages
312
Launched on MUSE
2014-01-01
Language
English
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.