cover

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pp. 1-1

Title Page, Series Page, Copyright

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pp. 2-5

Table of Contents

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pp. vi-7

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Acknowledgments

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pp. vii-9

I owe several institutions and individuals sincere gratitude for their support throughout the research and writing of this manuscript. To begin with, I received financial assistance in the form of studentships and travel grants from the International History Department at the London School of Economics. Additionally, the delightful and generous staff, especially Helmi Raaska, at the Gerald Ford ...

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Introduction

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pp. 1-13

At the beginning of 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union were still engaged in an era of détente, a reduction of tensions between the superpowers largely developed at the start of the decade by former U.S. president Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. However, the honeymoon period was over. In addition to problems over iss...

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1 "I Hadn't the Foggiest Idea."

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pp. 14-38

The United States considered the Horn of Africa a diplomatic backwater in the early 1970s. However, the eruption of Cold War competition for the loyalties of Ethiopia and Somalia would serve to ensure that President Gerald Ford took notice of the impoverished region. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger concisely summed up the classic Cold War paradox for the designers of American...

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2 "Why Just 'Wait and See'?"

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pp. 39-62

President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977 promising a new sense of idealism in American foreign policy. The Vietnam humiliation and the domestic scandals of the Nixon administration stirred in the American people a renewed taste for morality in the way the United States conducted itself. The voters had chosen an obscure southern governor...

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3 "We Have Expressed Our Conern to the Soviets."

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pp. 63-82

The still-inexperienced administration had committed a serious error in not anticipating that Siad Barre might take the initiative to invade the Ogaden after the United States had agreed to send arms to Somalia. The dictator’s ambitions in the Ogaden were well known, and the connection with his requests for arms should have been obvious. The trap of operating within the narrow confines of competition with the Soviet Union discouraged ...

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4 "Where the Two of Us Part"

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pp. 83-105

The history of American foreign policy includes a long list of debates on how the United States should intervene abroad. Friends and enemies have changed, but at heart of many of these arguments were differing concepts of what a “moral” foreign policy should look like. The Cyrus Vance–Zbigniew Brzezinski argument about Soviet intervention...

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5 "No Soviet Napoleon in Africa"

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pp. 106-128

The period from late May 1978 until the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979 represented a fundamental change in the conduct of American Cold War policy. This transformation was influenced by more than one factor, as indicated by the events and debates mentioned in previous chapters. However, a curious...

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Conclusion

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pp. 129-137

There was perhaps a brief window of time during which the United States had the opportunity to abandon the concept of containment and form a new approach to waging the Cold War. This particularly could have benefited the Third World, where superpower conflict caused the most damage—and its ill effects are today evident in the poverty...

Notes

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pp. 138-159

Bibliography

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pp. 160-165

index

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pp. 166-177

back cover

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pp. 178-178