Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge
Reflections on Objectivist Epistemology
Publication Year: 2013
Published by: University of Pittsburgh Press
Title Page, Copyright Page
The first volume in this series, Metaethics, Egoism, and Virtue: Studies in Ayn Rand’s Normative Theory, focused on aspects of Ayn Rand’s ethical theory. The present volume explores a more fundamental area of her philosophic thought: her epistemology or theory of knowledge. ...
Part One: Essays
Ayn Rand’s Theory of Concepts: Rethinking Abstraction and Essence
One notable change in the philosophical literature of the last thirty years has been the extent of attention to the nature of concepts. Although philosophers have been concerned with “conceptual analysis” and related issues since the early twentieth century (and in fact since Kant), ...
Conceptualization and Justification
Given its title, one might expect Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE) to outline her positions on the issues normally covered in introductory courses and texts on epistemology. In particular, one might expect to find discussions of epistemic justification—i.e., “our right to the beliefs we have” (Dancy 2005, 263). ...
Perceptual Awareness as Presentational
I enter my apartment from the outside. I can feel the smooth key as I take it from my pocket and the slight resistance of the lock as I use the key to turn the bolt. I open the door and feel its handle slide away from me and watch the door as it swings open. ...
Concepts, Context, and the Advance of Science
One central theme running through Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE) is that the objectivity of concepts is not threatened by, and in fact is a precondition for, the growth of knowledge. Crucial to her defense of that view is her argument that a proper account of definitions must reflect the fact that we learn more over time ...
Part Two: Discussion
Rand on Concepts, Definitions, and the Advance of Science: Comments on Gotthelf and Lennox
Ayn Rand’s theory of concept-formation plays an important role in her broader program of Objectivist epistemology. Some of the themes in her work correspond to core themes in what Ian Hacking calls the “tradition of natural kinds” in mainstream Anglo-American philosophy (Hacking 1991c). ...
Natural Kinds and Rand’s Theory of Concepts: Reflections on Griffiths
In his commentary on the essays in the present volume by Allan Gotthelf and by James G. Lennox, Paul Griffiths raises a number of interesting issues about (1) how to situate Rand’s theory of concepts, particularly with regard to recent debates about natural kinds, ...
Rand on Definitions—One Size Fits All?: Comments on Gotthelf
Rand’s normative discussion of definitions and concepts assumes that all definitions are of the same kind, do the same kinds of cognitive work, and should be evaluated against the same standards. This gives rise to troubles reminiscent of the ones Edouard Machery exposes with regard to concepts in cognitive psychology. ...
Taking the Measure of a Definition: Response to Bogen
Jim Bogen has provided us with a very thoughtful summary and critique of Rand’s theory of definition, attending to its basis in her theory of concepts. Though I do not think he always gets Rand’s views right, my disagreement is not primarily with his exposition but with his critique, ...
On Concepts that Change with the Advance of Science: Comments on Lennox
These comments represent the first round in print of an ongoing dialectic between James Lennox and me over the proper understanding of concepts and conceptual change in science, with a particular focus on the example of changing concepts of the gene. ...
Conceptual Development versus Conceptual Change: Response to Burian
In my essay in part 1 I characterized five categories of change in the conceptual structure of a science and stressed the importance of distinguishing them from the philosophically problematic notion of change in the meaning or identity of a concept. ...
In Defense of the Theory of Appearing: Comments on Ghate and Salmieri
As a fellow direct realist, and as a proponent of the Theory of Appearing (TA) in particular, I am naturally sympathetic to the account of perception that Onkar Ghate and Gregory Salmieri attribute to Rand in their essays in part 1 of this volume. ...
Forms of Awareness and “Three-Factor” Theories
In my contribution to part 1 of this volume, I discussed Rand’s view of awareness as an activity the identity of which is not exhausted by its objects, and I emphasized her distinction between the form of an act of awareness and its object, which I illustrated with a brief discussion of its application to sense-perception. ...
Direct Perception and Salmieri’s “Forms of Awareness”
I believe that what Salmieri calls “three-factor views” contain a deep and important insight about the nature of our perceptual relation with the mind-independent physical world around us. He correctly contrasts such views with representationalism, both old and new. ...
Keeping Up Appearances: Reflections on the Debate over Perceptual Infallibilism
Several contributors to this volume (Onkar Ghate, Pierre Le Morvan, Gregory Salmieri, and Bill Brewer) share an interest in defending direct realism (sometimes also called presentationalism) about the senses. They agree that perceptual awareness is the awareness of objects or even facts in the world, ...
Uniform Abbreviations of Works by Ayn Rand
Benjamin Bayer is visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Loyola University New Orleans. He is the author of two articles in Synthese and Acta Analytica that apply insights from the direct realist account of perception to the defense of foundationalist and internalist theories of justification, respectively. ...
Page Count: 200
Publication Year: 2013
OCLC Number: 867739259
MUSE Marc Record: Download for Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge