Commentaries on Aristotle's "On Sense and What Is Sensed" and "On Memory and Recollection" (Thomas Aquinas in Translation)
Publication Year: 2012
Published by: The Catholic University of America Press
Series: Thomas Aquinas in Translation
Preface and Acknowledgments
The present volume consists of English translations of the commentaries by Thomas Aquinas on the first two books of Aristotle’s Parva naturalia: De sensu et sensato and De memoria et reminiscentia. The translations are based on the critical edition of the commentaries published by René- Antoine Gauthier, O.P., in 1985 in Volume 45.2 of the Leonine...
COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S ON SENSE AND WHAT IS SENSED, Translated by Kevin White
The best way for the modern reader to approach this medieval commentary on an ancient text by Aristotle is to start by reading the ancient text—which is apparently a sequel to Aristotle’s On the Soul—on its own, outlining its structure, paraphrasing and summarizing, and noting any comments and questions that occur. The commentary can then be read...
As The Philosopher says in On the Soul III, “just as things are separable from matter, so also is what pertains to intellect”:1 for everything is intelligible inasmuch as it is separable from matter. Hence what is by nature ture separate from matter is of its very self intelligible in actuality; but what is abstracted by us from conditions of matter is made intelligible
Chapter 1. 436B8–437A19
First he determines about what pertains to the external sense-power. Second he determines about certain things pertaining to inner sensitive cognition, namely memory and recollection, where he says About memory and remembering (449b4); for the treatise On memory and recollection...
Chapter 2. 437A19–438A5
437a19 After The Philosopher has summarized what is necessary for the present consideration of sensitive powers themselves, now he proceeds to his principal proposal in this book by applying the consideration of sense-powers to what is bodily....
Chapter 3. 438A5–B2
On this point he does three things. First he shows what Democritus said correctly and what he said incorrectly. Second he follows up what he said incorrectly, where he says But it is inconsistent (438a10). Third he follows up what he said correctly, where he says
Chapter 4. 438B2–439A5
On this point he does three things. First he makes clear how vision occurs according to his own thought. Second, on this basis, he gives the cause of something mentioned above concerning the organ of sight, where he says It is reasonable (438b5). Third he shows the cause by...
Chapter 5. 439A6–B14
On the first point he does two things. First he proposes his intention. Second he clarifies what he said, where he says Each, then, is spoken of in two ways (439a12)....
Chapter 6. 439B14–440A15
Now the differences by which species are distinguished should divide a genus per se, not accidentally, as is clear in Metaphysics VII.1 Therefore, he concludes to the variety of species of color from the very nature of color, which he explained through the definition given above....
Chapter 7. 440A15–B28
On this point he does three things. First he eliminates a position from which one of the ways mentioned followed. Second he compares the ways mentioned to one another, where he says Accordingly, in the position that bodies are juxtaposed (440a20). Third he shows how far...
Chapter 8. 440B28–441A29
The first is why these should be treated in conjunction, namely because of their association, for the two are almost the same affection. He calls each of them an “affection” because both are in the third species of quality, which is “affection” or “passible quality.” He says that flavor...
Chapter 9. 441A30–442A11
On this point he does three things. First he gives the cause of the generation of flavors. Second he defines flavor, where he says And this is flavor (441b19). Third he clarifies something he said, where he says Now we must take it that flavors are affections (441b23)....
Chapter 10. 442A12–B26
On this point he does three things. First he shows the generation of intermediate flavors in general. Second he shows how intermediate flavors are diversified, where he says And these are also according to proportions (442a13). Third he shows how sweet and bitter are related to one...
Chapter 11. 442B27–443B16
This is divided into two parts. In the first he makes the determination about odors. In the second he compares the sense of smell to the other senses, where he says The senses exist in an odd number (Chapter 13, 445a4)....
Chapter 12. 443B17–444B7
On the first point he does three things. First he proposes that there are species of odor. Second he determines the species of odor by correspondence with species of flavor, where he says One kind of odor (443b19). Third he determines the species belonging to odor of itself...
Chapter 13. 444B7–445B2
Accordingly he first says that it is clear that animals that do not breathe sense the odorous because, as we see, fish and the whole class of insects— that is, partitioned animals such as ants, bees, and the like—acutely sense their nourishment from a distance, when they are too distant...
Chapter 14. 445B3–446A20
First he raises a question about sensible objects themselves. Second he raises another about alteration of the sense-power by a sensible object, where he says But someone will raise an objection (Ch.15, 446a20). Third he raises a third about the sense-power itself, where he says...
Chapter 16. 447A12–448A1
On this point he does three things. First he raises the question. Second he argues for the false position where he says If a greater movement (447a14). Third he determines the truth where he says With respect to the objection (Ch.18, 448b17)....
Chapter 17. 448A1–B16
He says that alterations caused by contraries are contrary, for instance heating and cooling. But contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same “atomon”—that is, the same indivisible part (contraries can simultaneously be in the same divisible part with respect to different...
Chapter 18. 448B17–449B4
On this point he does three things. First he investigates the truth about the aforementioned question. Second he proves something he presupposed in the foregoing, where he says Now it is clear that everything that is sensible (449a20). Third he adds an epilogue to what was said...
COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, Translated by Edward M. Macierowski
The occasion for the original draft of this introduction was a conference on Aristotle and Islamic philosophy in honor of Father Joseph Owens’s seventy-fifth birthday. For such a commemorative event it seemed not inappropriate, for three reasons, to focus on Thomas Aquinas’s...
Chapter 1. 449B4–30
As the Philosopher says in the seventh book on the Histories of Animals,6 nature proceeds from inanimate to animate things little by little, so that the genus of inanimate things comes before the genus of plants. For plants, when compared to other bodies, seem to be animate, even...
Chapter 2. 449B30–450A25
Concerning the first of these topics he does three things. First he sets out his intention. Second, by using an example, he explains what he has said, where he says For the same affection occurs (450a1). Third, he points out a related matter that must be considered elsewhere, where he says...
Chapter 3. 450A25–451A17
With respect to the first point he does three things: first he raises the difficulty; second, he makes one of its presuppositions explicit, where he says For it is clear (450a27); third he brings up the arguments bearing on the question, where he says But if such is the case (450b11)....
Chapter 4. 451A18–451B10
Accordingly, first he says that after he has spoken1 about remembering it remains for us to talk about recollecting, in order that whatever truths might be taken up by means of the dialectical discussions may first be supposed as being true. In this way he excuses himself from a long...
Chapter 5. 451B10–452A4
Concerning the first topic he does two things. He shows how recollecting takes place first with regard to the things one remembers; and second with regard to the time (for recollection is concerned with time, just as memory is), where he says It is most necessary, however, to know time...
Chapter 6. 452A4–B6
With respect to the first topic he does two things. First he shows how recollecting differs from relearning. Second3 he shows how recollecting differs from rediscovering, where he says Often, however, one cannot any longer recollect (452a7)....
Chapter 7. 452B7–453A4
He says first, therefore, that in recollecting it is most necessary to know time, namely the past, which memory is concerned with, which recollection is a search for; past time is known by one who is recollecting sometimes under a determinate measure, for instance when one knows that...
Chapter 8. 453A4–B11
He refers to three differences. The first of these stems from one’s aptitude for each of the other two. For it was said above2 that the same men are not good rememberers and good recollectors. The second difference stems from time, since recollection, because it is a path to memory...
Page Count: 278
Publication Year: 2012
Edition: 1st ed.
Series Title: Thomas Aquinas in Translation
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