Cover

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Title Page, Copyright

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pp. iii-iv

CONTENTS

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p. v

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PREFACE

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pp. vii-xiv

It was late afternoon on November 10, 1971, and for the first time in months, the thirty-seventh president of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, enjoyed a rare day relatively free from the stresses of the presidency. Instead of having to cope with the latest international or domestic crisis, he had spent the early afternoon talking to singer Pat Boone...

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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pp. xv-xvi

Anumber of people helped me produce this book. John Powers, formerly of the Nixon Project and now the deputy director of the National Archives and Records Administration’s Information Security Oversight Office, pointed me to the President’s Office Files as well as identified specific Nixon tapes to which I should listen. ...

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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pp. xvii-xviii

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1 Nixon Pushes Rapprochement

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pp. 1-13

Nixon first began pushing for rapprochement with the PRC during a 1967 world tour and polished up his foreign policy credentials for his expected run for president. Most important, he talked to two leaders whom he expected to help him work with the PRC. In March in Bucharest, he told Ceausescu—in what became a common theme...

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2 A New Mood in Beijing

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pp. 14-32

While the Nixon administration ramped up its public and private efforts to affect a rapprochement with the PRC, little did it know that Mao Zedong had decided to reciprocate. The evidence from U.S. archives, as noted above in chapter 1, shows that the administration hoped for a change in Chinese policy, but did not expect...

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3 Tentative Steps and the Warsaw Channel

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pp. 33-53

While the Nixon administration wrestled with the implications of the latest dimension of the Sino-Soviet split, Romanian Prime Minister Ion Maurer told Zhou Enlai that Nixon had “expressed without any reservation his wish of finding a way to normalize relations with China. ...

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4 The Post-Cambodia Chill and the Pakistani Channel

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pp. 54-78

The Nixon administration dismissed Mao’s statement as propaganda rather than a desire to abandon rapprochement. Kissinger called Mao’s statement “remarkably bland,” one that made “no threats” against the United States, offered “no commitments” to Hanoi, and, unlike his previous public statements, did not refer to other bilateral issues...

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5 Kissinger’s Secret Trip to Beijing

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pp. 79-103

As the Pakistanis and the Americans busied themselves making the final arrangements for the secret trip to China, the Soviets continued to warn the White House that Beijing could not be trusted, but unwittingly gave the White House more ammunition to engage in triangular diplomacy. During a three-hour dinner on June 8...

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6 Reassuring Allies and Pursuing the Moscow Summit

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pp. 104-119

The heady days after Kissinger’s visit and Nixon’s dramatic announcement quickly disappeared as the realities of international affairs hit the two men squarely in the face. Not only had the announcement upset many conservatives, the Taiwanese, the Japanese, and the Soviets, but the administration had to confront...

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7 Chinese at the UN and Kissinger’s Second Visit to Beijing

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pp. 120-143

The administration continued to discuss the UN issue and linked it to Kissinger’s second, public trip to Beijing, scheduled for late October. Kissinger recognized that Nixon had been mulling over the public relations side of rapprochement with Haldeman, but advised the president “to tell Bush to delay the goddamn thing no matter what it costs.” ...

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8 Sino-U.S. Rapprochement and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

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pp. 144-168

Just as the uproar over Taiwan’s expulsion from the UN began to subside, and on the eve of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s state visit to the United States, the Indo-Pakistani crisis threatened to explode into a full-fledged war, which directly impacted relations between the United States and the PRC. ...

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9 Homestretch to the Beijing Summit

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pp. 169-181

President Nixon celebrated the new year with a long, detailed interview with CBS television reporter Dan Rather. After answering a number of questions about Vietnam, Nixon discussed his impending trip to Beijing. Dismissing speculation that the visit was politically motivated, Nixon said that the process had taken a couple of years...

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10 The Beijing Summit

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pp. 182-201

On February 17, the president’s plane, which he had renamed Spirit of ’76 specifically for the summit, left Washington with Malraux’s words ringing his ears. Nixon recalled that Kissinger and Haldeman said that “there was almost a religious feeling to the messages we received from all the country, wishing us well.” ...

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11 Conclusion

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pp. 202-210

The Spirit of ’76 arrived in Washington at Andrews Air Force Base on February 28. Vice President Spiro Agnew, Nixon’s daughters, and even Dobrynin (but not Shen) led the enthusiastic crowd of 15,000 who greeted the party. One onlooker said, “It’s sort of like seeing the astronauts coming back from the moon.” ...

Images

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NOTES

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pp. 211-256

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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pp. 257-264

INDEX

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pp. 265-274