Intercorporeal Self, The
Publication Year: 2012
Published by: State University of New York Press
Title Page, Copyright Page
In Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau‑Ponty remarks on the strange manner in which we discover, in a kind of unending process, the patterns of our own thinking only by letting it find its expression in the context of our relations with others. He writes...
List of Abbreviations
“Who Comes After the Subject?”: this title of a 1991 collection of essays edited by Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy reflects a certain anxiety felt by many contemporary thinkers concerning the status of the modern subject (in the ontological, epistemological...
Chapter 1: Situation and the Embodied Mind
Merleau‑Ponty’s phenomenology has been influential in a number of recent attempts to rethink the nature of cognition. Against a prevalent tendency in cognitive science and neuroscience to model cognition after computational processes, some have insisted that cognition...
Chapter 2: Making Space
We concluded chapter 1 by drawing attention to the continuity between Merleau‑Ponty’s accounts of sensation and spatiality. The claim that sensations are intrinsically spatial is, as we have seen, crucial to Merleau‑Ponty’s argument against the empiricist notion of atomic...
Chapter 3: Subjectivity and the ‘Style’ of the World
Gibson’s ecological psychology, like O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor approach, seems able to offer us an account of the appearance of a world‑in‑depth. It is a world whose phenomenality involves a kind of solicitation of our self‑moving bodies—it appears...
Chapter 4: Auto‑affection and Alterity
Perceptual experience is inherently temporal. The subject of perception is situated (spatially and temporally) by means of the manner in which experience anticipates its own future unfolding, and retains its past accomplishments both in the temporal thickness...
Chapter 5: Ipseity and Language
In each of the previous chapters we have come up against what some readers have identified as a certain tension in Merleau‑Ponty’s thinking about subjectivity in Phenomenology of Perception. On the one hand Merleau‑Ponty seems to suggest that, beneath the explicit...
In the Introduction, I referred to Merleau‑Ponty’s call for an “ontological rehabilitation of the sensible” (S, 166–7/271) and I suggested both that this task, in a certain sense, defines Merleau‑Ponty’s philosophical project and that it is in the context of this project...
Page Count: 254
Publication Year: 2012
OCLC Number: 802059014
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