Title Page, Copyright, Series Information

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Contents

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pp. vii-viii

About the Authors

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pp. ix-x

Dedication

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pp. xi-xii

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Introduction

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pp. 1-3

Our first book, Working, Shirking, and Sabotage, asked who, or what, controls the policy choices of bureaucrats. The overwhelming evidence indicated that individual bureaucrats’ preferences had the greatest effect. Fellow bureaucrats, the public whom the bureaucrat...

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1. Alternative Roles

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pp. 4-16

Suppose that it is your responsibility to encourage more effort from an employee on a task. The task might be straightforward (say, processing tax returns or collecting mail) or more complex (say, teaching children or managing the drug rehabilitation of recalcitrant clients)...

Part 1. Training

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pp. 17-18

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2. Empirical Data on Training

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pp. 19-41

What is the strength of the evidence that training clarifies the boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate behavior, or between what is meritorious and what leads to punishment? Training is one way to make the bureaucrat’s job less ambiguous, not so...

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3. Adapting Preferences

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pp. 42-60

Early management schemes, such as those mentioned in chapter 1, worried about characteristics of the division of labor between subordinates and supervisors that inhibited close supervision. Such scholars—especially Luther Gulick—debated optimum span of control...

Part 2. Task Management

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pp. 61-62

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4. Task Allocation in Public Bureaucracies

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pp. 63-76

As should be becoming evident after reading this far, organization theorists are consistent in their argument that the coercive aspects of supervision in public bureaucracies alone cannot account for high levels of performance. Indeed, this point may have...

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5. Task Allocation in Policing

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pp. 77-108

In this chapter, we extend our analysis of the supervisor as coordinator within a public bureaucracy, a role consistent with both principalagency approaches and organization theory.1 In this role the supervisor must define and allocate tasks across subordinates (Wilson 1989). Tasks...

Part 3. Trust Brokering

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pp. 109-110

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6. Trust Brokering

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pp. 111-130

Trust is a central aspect of human relations, and within the context of organizations it plays a particularly strong role. Of course, just what one means by the notion of trust is decidedly unclear. One approach, quite popular with survey researchers, had been to use trust of government or of people in general as proxies for some generalized...

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7. Rules, Trust, and the Allocation of Time

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pp. 131-143

In this chapter, we aim to synthesize the extensive literature in social psychology and organization theory on supervision and leadership. We take as our point of departure an argument from organization theory: the fundamental problem for public bureaucracies is ambiguity...

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8. Leadership: Middle Managers and Supervision

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pp. 144-150

The most conventional view of leadership in political organizations is that leadership trickles down from the top. For example, Daniel Carpenter’s Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy, uses the example of people such as James Wilson and Montgomery Blair (2001). Wilson helped...

Notes

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pp. 151-156

References

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pp. 157-164

Index

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pp. 165-172