Cover

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Title Page, Copyright

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Contents

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Acknowledgments

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pp. ix-ix

All but two essays in this book are new essays on dualism and physicalism. Richard Swinburne’s essay “From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism” appeared in Persons: Human and Divine, edited . . .

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Introduction: After Physicalism

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pp. 1-24

What am I? Who, if those questions are supposed to be different, am I? Understanding these questions is understanding what philosophy of mind, or rational psychology, as it used to be called, is about. . .

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Chapter 1: The Naturalness of Dualism

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pp. 25-47

In his famous biography of Samuel Johnson, James Boswell recounts the following anecdote (see, for example, Boswell . .

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Chapter 2: Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism

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pp. 48-71

Non-Cartesian substance dualism is a position in the philosophy of mind concerning the nature of the mind-body relation—or, more exactly, the person-body relation. It maintains that this is a relationship . . .

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Chapter 3: Subjects of Mentality

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pp. 72-103

There are two kinds of entity that feature in the mental realm. On the one hand, there are items of mentality (mental items). These are such things as sense experiences, beliefs, emotions, and decisions, . . .

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Chapter 4: Against Materialism

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pp. 104-146

I propose to give two arguments against materialism—or, if you think that’s too negative, two arguments for substantial dualism. ‘Substantial’ is to be taken in two senses: first, the dualism in . . .

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Chapter 5: From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism

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pp. 147-179

“Mental properties are the same as physical properties,” “mental events are the same as physical events,” “mental substances are the same as physical substances”—says many a physicalist. . . .

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Chapter 6: Is Materialism Equivalent to Dualism?

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pp. 180-199

Is materialism equivalent to dualism? Clearly not, if the question is taken in its most natural sense, as referring to the entire families of philosophical views known respectively as dualism and materialism. . . .

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Chapter 7: Benign Physicalism

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pp. 200-230

This essay may seem an odd one to be included in the present collection, since in it I argue that a certain form of physicalism may be true. I always used to think that physicalism, in any form, could not . . .

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Chapter 8: Qualia, Qualities, and Our Conception of the Physical World

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pp. 231-263

The dialectical situation in which the knowledge argument (KA) for property dualism is usually taken to be located is the following.1 It is taken as agreed that physicalism gives an adequate account of . . .

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Chapter 9: Groundwork for a Dualism of Indistinction

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pp. 263-294

Although “most contemporary analytic philosophers [endorse] a physicalist picture of the world” (Newen et al. 2007: 147), it is unclear what exactly the physicalist thesis states. I briefly argue that . . .

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Chapter 10: The Unconditioned Soul

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pp. 295-334

There is a distinction to be drawn between conditioned and unconditioned philosophy. Unconditioned philosophy entails ultimate explanation of how philosophical problems may be formulated. Conditioned . . .

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Chapter 11: Beyond Dualism? : The Track-Switch Model of Resurrection

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pp. 335-368

It is not impossible to be a materialist and to believe in the resurrection of the dead. As Hudson pointed out, in a number of publications, 1 a materialist still has some tools in his bag of tricks to reconcile . . .

Contributors

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pp. 369-371

Index

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pp. 372-374

Back Cover

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