Cover

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Title Page, Copyright Page

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CONTENTS

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pp. v-vi

PARTICIPANTS

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p. vii

ILLUSTRATIONS

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pp. ix-x

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FOREWORD

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pp. xi-xii

This volume is one of three in a series devoted to the theme: “Questioning Nineteenth-Century Assumptions about Knowledge.” The project was organized by Jean-Pierre Dupuy (a philosopher of science affiliated with the Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie Appliquée, Paris), Aviv Bergman (an evolutionary biologist who directs the Aviv Bergman Laboratory at the Albert Einstein School of Medicine, New York), ...

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INTRODUCTION

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pp. 1-4

Following the 2004 meeting held at Stanford University, which dealt with “determinism,” the second of the three symposia on “Questioning Nineteenth-Century Assumptions about Knowledge” underwritten by the Gulbenkian Foundation was convened at the Maison Suger, Paris, France, 16–17 December 2005. ...

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SESSION I [Includes Discussion]

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pp. 5-56

Broadly speaking, “reductionism” is used in philosophy to refer to doctrines according to which one can explain some object by reducing it to a different, usually simpler, level—for example, the meaningful to the physical as in behaviorism, knowledge to sense data as in phenomenalism, the social to the biological as in sociobiology. ...

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SESSION II [Includes Discussion]

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pp. 57-106

The aim of this paper is to ponder a number of issues about emergence that have occupied recent philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. I will focus in particular on the concept of emergence in relation to complex (nonlinear) dynamical systems. In this context, an emergent process is said to be one that belongs to an ensemble or network of elements, arises spontaneously or self-organizes from the locally defined and globally constrained...

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SESSION III [Includes Discussion]

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pp. 107-166

Classically, a reductionist thesis posits that complex high level phenomena, structures, and processes can be reduced, as far as their scientific explanation is concerned, to underlying lower level phenomena, structures, and processes. The most paradigmatic and best-investigated example is the reduction of macroscopic thermodynamics to microscopic molecular and atomic movements...

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SESSION IV [Includes Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Aviv Bergman, and Discussion]

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pp. 167-192

I absolutely agree that the various divisions within the social sciences, the so-called disciplines, no longer have an intellectual meaning and that intellectually we should think of them as part of a single unified domain that I call historical social science. Nonetheless, there are certain techniques that are associated with the historical disciplines and I shall pretend first to be an ethnographer, and then pretend to be a traditional historian. ...

INDEX [Includes Back Cover]

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pp. 193-205