Cover

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Title Page, Copyright, Dedication

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Contents

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List of Figures

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pp. ix-ix

List of Tables

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pp. xi-xii

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Acknowledgments

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pp. xiii-xv

I owe a great debt to the state legislators who took the time to complete the survey that provided the essential data for this book. In addition I would like to thank the legislators, legislative staff, journalists, and others who spoke with me or who responded to email queries. This book would not have been possible without their help...

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Introduction

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pp. 1-11

The belief that money buys influence from elected legislators has led to laws to curtail the influence of money1 and has fostered a sense of cynicism among citizens and elites.2 Despite considerable research by scholars, questions of how much influence money has and when it is most and least influential remain unsettled. Indeed, 30 years of academic research have led some scholars to conclude...

Part I: The Influence of Money and the Context of Fundraising in State Legislatures

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1. Measuring the Influence of Campaign Contributions in the Legislative Process

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pp. 15-32

Influence is notoriously difficult to measure in political science and, consequently, despite its importance, is greatly understudied (Dür and de Bièvre 2007). Many excellent campaign finance studies describe spending and contribution patterns and the regulatory framework that structures these activities. Moncrief and Thompson (1998) is the most comprehensive..

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2. Patterns of State Legislative Campaign Finance

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pp. 33-55

When elections and campaign finance issues are discussed, the images and features that come to mind are typically based on congressional or presidential races. The incredible variability of state legislative elections rarely informs our debate. At both state and federal levels, candidates raise money from donors constrained by rules set by the parties, state, and federal...

Part II: The Microlevel: The Fundraising of Individual Legislators

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3. An Investment Model of Campaign Contributions

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pp. 59-77

While donors have many reasons for making political contributions, many give, especially to incumbents or to odds-on favorites in open seats, in the expectation that of‹ceholders will be particularly attentive to their interests. The basis for the prevalence of these service-induced contributions is discussed in chapter 2. The existing literature, however, provides...

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4. The Time Legislators Devote to Fundraising

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pp. 78-105

Legislators complain about the time they need to spend fundraising— time they could otherwise use to represent their constituents and make policy. Some retiring officeholders include the demands of fundraising among the factors precipitating their retirement. And some potential candidates say they are discouraged from running by these demands...

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5. How Much Is a Legislator’s Time Worth to a Contributor?

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pp. 106-127

Legislators make choices about how much time to spend fundraising. Donors make choices about whether and how much to contribute to legislative campaigns. Underlying these choices is the recognition by both donor and legislator that contributions imply commitments. Donors’ expectations may range from simple...

Part III: The Macrolevel: Differences across Legislative Chambers

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6. The Influence of Campaign Contributions in Legislative Chambers

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pp. 131-154

Investment theories of campaign finance posit a relationship between campaign contributions and a member’s legislative activity. Despite a large body of scholarship, the magnitude and even existence of the relationship is still in doubt. In chapter 1, I argue the merits of a survey-based perceptual measure of the influence of contributions..

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7. Fundraising for the Caucus: Expectations and Practices

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pp. 155-175

Increasingly legislators, especially party leaders, committee chairs, and those who aspire to hold those offices, are expected to raise campaign funds that will be used to aid electorally vulnerable members and to elect new members. Party leaders are the agents of their members, and, as legislative scholars note, “Satisfying the expectations of followers...

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8. Fundraising and Lobbying

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pp. 176-200

There are two differing views of lobbying in the scholarly literature. One argues that the access legislators give lobbyists is often based on campaign donations—“pay to play.” To the extent that the opportunity to lobby is contingent on campaign donations and future donations are contingent on legislators’ responsiveness to lobbyists, campaign donations may cause legislators to trade off...

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Conclusion

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pp. 201-214

At the height of the Jack Abramoff influence-buying scandal in Congress, commentators and politicians debated the causes, extent, and nature of the corruption. George Will (2005) summarized the bottom line of what many politicians, pundits, and scholars cite as academic research’s contribution to the debate: “Abundant political science demonstrates...

Appendix A: Survey of State Legislators

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pp. 215-219

Appendix B: Winbugs Code

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pp. 221-226

Notes

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pp. 227-232

References

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pp. 233-242

Index

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pp. 243-254