Cover

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Title page

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Copyright

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CONTENTS

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p. vii

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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pp. ix-x

ALTHOUGH the last thing to be written in this book, my thanks are placed first. That is as it should be. Gareth Davies, Katharine Ellis, David Goldey, Desmond King, and Alan Ware read and commented perceptively upon the manuscript. Katharine Ellis has been richly supportive throughout this project: it could not and would not...

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ONE: Authority and Power in Presidential Politics

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pp. 3-37

CONTROLLING economic and financial markets in peacetime ranks high among significant presidential acts. In August, 1971, Pres. Richard Nixon electrified fellow politicians and voters alike by telling television viewers that he had done just that. In a nationwide address he announced that he had frozen wages and prices, ended the convert...

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TWO: Paying for Vietnam: The Tax Surcharge Extension of 1969

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pp. 38-77

Turning to economic policy, Moynihan advised Nixon that his other political objectives would hinge upon economic performance: “The single most important task,” he wrote, “is to maintain the rate of economic expansion.”2 The president-elect underlined the clause and checked the margin twice. Moynihan then...

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THREE: Making the Weather: The Politics of Wages and Prices, 1969–71

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pp. 78-116

RICHARD NIXON’S conduct of wage and price policy between the transition from Lyndon Johnson’s presidency to his own statutory freezing of wages and prices in August, 1971, is a window onto a past both temporally recent and ideationally distant, when such an action was thought intellectually plausible and politically possible, even...

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FOUR: Sheltering from the Storm: Nixon’s New Wage and Price Policy

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pp. 117-161

IN THE MONTH that Nixon froze prices and wages, consumer prices were rising at an annual rate of 4.53 percent. The freeze did not eliminate inflation, but the rate fell during the following three months to less than 4 percent and drifted downward under the controls that followed...

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FIVE: The Death of Bretton Woods

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pp. 162-195

FOR THE DECADE and more after 1945, America’s balance-of-payments deficit was an international public good. It made possible Western Europe’s recovery by solving the international economy’s central defect during the period—that America’s trading partners’ shortage...

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SIX: Facing Down the Fed

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pp. 196-234

THE CONDUCT of monetary policy matters for the president, for Congress, for foreign governments and international institutions, for business borrowers and lenders, for employees, for investors, and for those living on fixed incomes. It shapes and constrains politicians’ opportunities and businesses’ risks, profits, investments, output, and...

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SEVEN: Legacy and Significance

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pp. 235-249

I HAVE TRIED in this study to demonstrate the analytical utility of Richard Neustadt’s framework and to reveal both the complexity of the bases of President Nixon’s authority and power and his use of them in the conduct of his economic business. The book shows Nixon’s expansive...

APPENDIX

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pp. 251-253

NOTES

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pp. 255-287

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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pp. 289-294

INDEX

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pp. 295-305