Cover

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Frontmatter

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Contents

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p. vii

List of Tables

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p. ix

List of Figures

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p. x

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Acknowledgments

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pp. xi-xii

As this project has progressed from some rather inchoate ideas about European integration to a full-fledged book, I have incurred numerous debts to the individuals and institutions who have supported me. I will attempt to acknowledge as many of them as possible, although it is impossible to mention them all. The core idea for this book can be ...

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Introduction

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pp. 1-7

Many major breakthroughs in European integration have occurred during intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), the forums at which European Union (EU) member states negotiate European treaties. Since the founding of the European Communities with the Treaty of Rome, member states have completed a common market, created a ...

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1. Institutional Design at IGCs

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pp. 8-19

Why should we care about the rules by which EU states draft their treaties? Why should we care whether veto power is more important in determining bargaining strength than power derived from economic might or population size? The most obvious reason is that bargaining rules and bargaining power determine which states get what they ...

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2. Case Selection

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pp. 20-64

Both institutional and intergovernmental theories of European integration stress the importance of member state preferences in determining outcomes. However, they diff er in their assessments of whose preferences are most important. Tests of these theories clearly require data on member state bargaining positions. Before examining institutional ...

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3. Modeling Institutionalism and Intergovernmentalism

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pp. 65-75

The previous chapter presented my quantitative data on the Treaty of Amsterdam and asked which actors want what and why at intergovernmental conferences. This chapter presents a framework for understanding why some member states get what they want while others do not. I examine competing models of bargaining, institutionalism ...

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4. Testing Institutionalism and Intergovernmentalism

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pp. 76-88

This chapter applies the data I presented in chapter 2 to the model presented in chapter 3. In doing so, I begin to examine sources of power at IGCs. Chapter 2 explored possible reasons for missing member state preferences and found that a member state's missing preference may indicate a preference for the status quo, but may also indicate indi fference ...

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5. Winners and Losers at Amsterdam

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pp. 89-98

The number of member states preferring the status quo is the strongest predictor of whether change is likely to occur, but just who are those member states? The previous two chapters have presented and tested general theories of bargaining at IGCs, and there I find that institutional theory better captures IGC negotiations compared with intergovernmental ...

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6. Council Votes and Commissioners

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pp. 99-121

Until this point, I have used large-n statistical analyses of data from the EU's Amsterdam IGC to demonstrate the sources of power most likely to benefi t a member state at IGCs. Confi rming institutional theory, I have found that states with positions closest to the status quo, and not those with the most resources, realize their preferences most ...

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7. Exit Threats, Veto Rights, and Integration

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pp. 122-138

While the previous chapters have focused on testing theories of bargaining power against one another, the next two chapters use a formal model to explore the conditions under which veto power should matter in intergovernmental negotiations. The basic argument is that for veto rights to matter in an international organization or federal union ...

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8. British Accession: Exit Options and Veto Power

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pp. 139-146

The previous chapter presented a formal model to highlight when exit options are likely an important source of bargaining power compared with veto rights. In addition, the game suggested how organizations can move from a regime where states can credibly threaten to exit to a regime where they can threaten to veto. This chapter returns to ...

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Conclusion

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pp. 147-155

On December 1, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty took eff ect. This event marked the end of a remarkable period beginning in the late 1980s during which the EU reexamined its treaty law every several years. This book has examined the rules by which member states in the European Union collectively make choices about treaty outcomes at ...

Notes

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pp. 157-166

References

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pp. 167-178

Index

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pp. 179-184