The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile
Publication Year: 2009
Published by: University of Notre Dame Press
Tables and Figures
Note on Translations
Preface and Acknowledgments
I did not know it at the time, but this book began with the military coup in Chile on September 11, 1973. I was eight years old, and the coup marked me, as it did every Chilean. My parents had supported the Allende government, my father spent eighteen months as a political prisoner after the coup, and in 1975 he and my mother fled to Canada as refugees with my two sisters and...
ONE: The Dark Spaces of Politics
Coercion—the threat to employ brute physical force and the actual employment of such force—is central to politics. In a foundation that stretches from Hobbes to Weber, it defines our basic political institutions. But despite its importance, analyzing how various types of coercive institutions operate—and why they differ across time and space—remains...
TWO: The Coercion Problem
A clarification about what this book is not. It is not a book about why the military or the police take power. Political interventions by the armed forces in many parts of the world during the 1960s and 1970s spurred scholarly interest on this problem (Stepan 1971; O’Donnell 1973; D. Collier 1979; Lowenthal and Fitch 1986). In some cases I refer to these works...
THREE: The Overthrow and Turmoil
The Chilean Armed Forces overthrew the Allende government on the morning of September 11, 1973, with swift and overwhelming force.1 They launched a massive assault on La Moneda, the presidential palace, through a combination of air and ground attacks. They disbanded Congress and banned all other independent political organizations, including the country’s main...
FOUR: The Rise of the DINA (1973–74)
At the beginning of 1974, observers noticed a new coercive organization whose agents, in civilian clothing and unmarked cars, would round up people and detain them in a variety of new locations. The DINA would not receive official status until June 1974, but its detentions had become apparent several months before. As the DINA became increasingly active, it took over the bulk...
FIVE: The DINA in Action (1974–77)
The DINA aimed to resolve a set of political and organizational problems that the dictatorship faced during the first few months after the coup. During this early period—the bloodiest of the dictatorship—detentions, torture, and summary executions were carried out in relatively public view, a practice that became increasingly costly in political terms for the regime. Compounding this problem...
SIX: The Fall of the DINA (1977–78)
A second shift in how the dictatorship organized its repressive agencies took place from 1977 to 1978. In August 1977, the regime replaced the DINA with a different institution, the Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI). At first, the DINA team also led the CNI, with Contreras and his men still at the helm, but this team fell from power in April 1978, and their departure coincided with...
SEVEN: Options and Shifts
As shown in previous chapters, the regime created the DINA to resolve specific organizational problems, but the DINA did not completely take over and redirect coercion, and conflicts remained between the DINA and other coercive agencies (in particular the air force’s intelligence agency [SIFA] and the Comando Conjunto), which undermined regime cohesion. Moreover, as the DINA ran...
EIGHT: The Politics of Organizing Coercion
A common justification for authoritarian rule is the promise to “get rid of politics” by replacing corrupt, ineffective, or quarrelsome politicians with a more disciplined military, party, or bureaucratic cadre. This book throws such a notion into doubt by showing that even in authoritarian regimes, organizing coercion is a distinctly and unavoidably political problem of governance. Rulers have to...
Page Count: 264
Publication Year: 2009
OCLC Number: 694145914
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