A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc: Polish–East German Relations, 1945–1962 (review)

Sheldon Anderson, A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc: Polish-East German Relations, 1945-1962. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001. 314 pp. $30.00.

Sheldon Anderson argues in this book that "irreconcilable national differences" resulted in a "cold war of misunderstanding and distrust" between the Polish and East German Communists (p.2). The high level of discord between Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1945 to 1962 and beyond, Anderson contends, confirms the polycentrist interpretation of the Soviet bloc. The Communist parties of Poland (the PZPR) and East Germany (the SED), he maintains, were not subject to Moscow's monolithic control; instead, they promoted their own distinct interests whenever possible.

Drawing on extensive research in Polish and German archives, Anderson examines five enduring areas of contention between the Polish and East German Communists. The first three emerged immediately after World War II and persisted through 1962.

First, the SED refused to recognize the new Polish-German border, the Oder- Neisse Line, until compelled to do so by Moscow in 1951. Even then, the SED refused to endorse the PZPR's historical arguments in favor of the border and did little within East Germany to publicize its acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line. This led many Polish Communists to conclude that the SED nurtured hopes of one day securing the border's revision.

Second, the status of ethnic Germans in Poland frequently clouded relations between Warsaw and East Berlin. The East German authorities complained when Poland halted the repatriation of Germans in 1953, but also protested when Poland resumed the repatriations in 1955. To the SED's embarrassment, a majority of the ethnic Germans chose to resettle in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) rather than the GDR.

Third, persistent disagreements over trade undermined fraternal ties. The GDR consistently sought larger deliveries of coal from Poland than the PZPR was willing or able to deliver, and the PZPR complained about the GDR's failure to meet its trade commitments and the shoddiness of its goods.

Relations between the PZPR and SED only worsened in the wake of the "Polish October" of 1956. More ethnic Germans opted to settle in the FRG, more coal went undelivered, more trade quotas went unmet, and more East German officials expressed reservations about the Oder-Neisse Line than ever before. The differences between the Polish and East German parties spread to a fourth area, the realm of ideology. The SED opposed the idea of a "Polish road to socialism" propagated by Poland's reform Communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka. Long after Moscow had tempered its attacks on Poland's "deviations," the East Germans continued their public criticism of Poland for its retreat from collectivized agriculture, its relative toleration of the Catholic Church, and its moderate censorship. After 1956 a fifth area of dispute arose, namely, foreign policy. Gomulka improved Poland's economic and political relations with the West, including West Germany. According to Anderson, the Polish leader sought to "balance Poland's relations between the two blocs and the two Germanies"—a policy unacceptable to the GDR (p.184).

Having looked at many of the same materials that Anderson has examined, I generally concur in his assessment. There were persistent disagreements between the Polish and East German Communists in the five areas that he cites. Such conflicts would have been impossible in a monolithic bloc completely dominated by Moscow. Thus, Anderson's findings do tend to confirm the polycentrist interpretation of the Soviet bloc for the period after 1955.

At the same time, Anderson concedes that he has "intentionally focused on those issues that were persistently contentious" in Polish-East German relations (p.5). This leads to some exaggeration of the differences between the PZPR and the SED. In the case of Poland, he conflates public sentiment with Communist Party attitudes, especially when it comes to Gomulka. At one point he...