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Journal of Cold War Studies 3.3 (2001) 102-104



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Book Review

American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War:
An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992


Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992 . Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997. 456 pp. $24.95.

Robert Hutchings has written this book from a dual perspective: As Director of European Affairs in the U.S. National Security Council in 1989-1992, he was an active participant in the events described in the book; as a Woodrow Wilson Center fellow in 1993 and 1994 he analyzed those same events from a historical point of view. Hutchings benefited from his first-hand observations of the decision-making process, [End Page 102] but his insider status created the risk that his account would be biased. However, because he joined the Bush administration not as a party man but as an academic expert, he is well aware of the perils of "immediate history." He manages to avoid pitfalls such as overrating his personal role or engaging in self-justification. His personal recollections of events and his access to internal sources result in a fascinating story of the U.S. contribution to the end of the Cold War.

U.S.-Soviet interaction in the European theater was crucial. Hutchings makes clear that the collapse of Communist East Germany and the rest of the Soviet Union's "external empire" in 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the Soviet acceptance of German membership in NATO cannot simply be attributed to Soviet "new thinking" or diminishing Soviet power. A decisive factor was President George Bush's new approach to Soviet affairs. From Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, conventional wisdom in Washington had held that the first priority should be to seek good relations with Moscow and that problems posed by the "Brezhnev Doctrine" (the denial of self-determination to the East European countries) could be solved only on this basis. Bush took the opposite approach: He insisted that any improvement in relations with the United States would depend on the Soviet Union's willingness to permit greater freedom in Eastern Europe.

Underlying Bush's strategy was the premise that East-West conflict was rooted in Soviet policies toward the Eastern bloc. The Cold War had originated in Eastern Europe, and it would have to end there as well. The Soviet Union would have to relinquish its tight hold over Eastern Europe.

To be sure, this new policy was not without its risks. Decision makers in Washington did not intend to alienate Gorbachev; rather, they wanted to induce him to cooperate. This meant that the United States had to steer between the Scylla of excessive demands and the Charybdis of undue benevolence. The Bush administration's skillful handling of Soviet affairs and the profound domestic changes in the Soviet Union combined to make this course successful. Both Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, encouraged Gorbachev to live up to the promise of his new thinking and to implement the free-choice principle he espoused. As a reward they articulated their demands in a low-key manner and were willing to support the Soviet leader in seeking peaceful, orderly channels of change. From the beginning the new approach had far-reaching operative implications. For the Bush administration, arms control ceased to be the dominant priority that determined all other relations with the Soviet Union. Instead it was relegated to the status of a secondary issue that would naturally be resolved once the main conflict over Eastern Europe was settled. This approach eliminated the fundamental dilemma that had greatly impaired Western policy until then. The forces of emancipation and reform in Eastern Europe were no longer seen as destabilizing (and therefore unwelcome), and the United States ceased to regard Soviet repression as an unfortunate but necessary means of guaranteeing European...

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