Lincoln’s Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of thePotomac (review)

Lincoln's Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of the Potomac. By Edward G. Longacre. (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2000. Pp. ix, 470. Cloth, $34.95.)

Few, if any, historians of the Civil War have devoted more attention to the operations of Union cavalry in the Eastern Theater than Edward G. Longacre, whose published works include biographies of James H. Wilson and John Buford, a volume on George Custer's Michigan Cavalry Brigade, and a prize-winning study of cavalry operations at Gettysburg. Here, Longacre looks to build on his previous efforts and craft a comprehensive single-volume "organizational, administrative, and operational history of the mounted arm of 'Mr. Lincoln's Army'" (vii).

There is much to admire in this book. To be sure, cavalry operations in the East have hardly been neglected by students of the Civil War, but never have they been as thoroughly researched (included among the impressive array of sources Longacre consulted are the unpublished letters and diaries of over four hundred soldiers) or as fully chronicled (with one significant caveat) in a single volume as they are here. The descriptions of how cavalrymen were recruited, equipped, and trained are insightful and informative; the narratives of operations are clear and entertaining; and the analysis of men and events is balanced and generally persuasive.

Among the more interesting aspects of Lincoln's Cavalrymen is Longacre's rejection of the notion that Confederate cavalry enjoyed a qualitative superiority over their Union counterparts during the first two years of the war. The embarrassments that Federal cavalry endured early in the war were not attributable, he argues, to inferiority in equipment, riding ability, or tactical skill, but to the faulty leadership of commanders such as George Stoneman, Philip St. George Cooke, and Alfred Pleasanton. Longacre also downplays the importance of the celebrated Battle of Brandy Station. It was not Brandy Station, he contends, that demonstrated Union cavalry could stand up to the cavaliers in gray, but the March 17, 1863, battle at Kelly's Ford, which Longacre suggests was the true turning point in the struggle between Northern and Southern cavalry in the East.

This is not a book for enthusiasts of the "new military history," as there is little effort to address how the experiences of the men who served in the Union cavalry reflected broader developments in American society and culture during the Middle Period. Perhaps the most disappointing part of the book, however, is its superficial treatment of the Second Manassas campaign. This important campaign, in which cavalry operations and the misuse of cavalry by Federal commanders played a significant role, receives less than two pages of coverage, which is less than the number devoted to a single battle in the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864.

These quibbles aside, Longacre is to be commended for what is, on the whole, a worthwhile and useful book. It further establishes his reputation as a fine narrative historian and adds to a body of work that will be the standard against which future scholarship on Union cavalry in the East will be measured.