Perspectivism and Falsification: A Reply to Maudemarie Clark

In this reply, I defend my views on Nietzsche’s “falsification thesis” and his perspectivism against Maudemarie Clark’s recent criticisms, which appeared in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 49.1. I begin by amplifying my interpretation of Gay Science 110 and 111, which, I argue, show that the falsification thesis is absent from The Gay Science. I then turn to perspectivism and argue that, contrary to Clark’s claims, perspectivism never involves the falsification of the views to which it applies. It is therefore unnecessary to apply perspectivism, as Clark does, only to value-imbued viewpoints and not to empirical knowledge or the natural sciences. Perspectivism, as Nietzsche, I believe, makes clear, applies to every aspect of human knowledge.