Heidegger on Kant, Finitude, and the Correlativity of Thinking and Being

Although Heidegger’s evaluation of Kant’s philosophy underwent a significant change after his early work on Kant, a continuity can be found between his early and late interpretations in terms of a certain common problem they all elaborate on. Through the unitary reconstruction I make of the key moments of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, I argue that this problem concerns how, within the transcendental framework of Kant’s transformation and restriction of traditional ontology, the correlativity of thinking and being is discerned and grounded. In each of the systematic readings he offers of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger attempts to take critique to its highest moment of self-understanding and assess how and why certain aspects and implications of this correlativity can be addressed by transcendental critique while others escape it.