Abstract

Abstract:

I reply to comments by my critics. David Davies defends Jerrold Levinson’s definition of art from my criticism by invoking an analogy with lying. Lie-attempts fail, Davies holds, by failing to deceive, not by failing to generate lies at all. Perhaps art is similar. In response, I offer an analysis of lying showing that a lie-attempt can fail to generate a lie at all. The analogy, then, fails to offer an alternative model of how X-attempts succeed and fail. Keith Lehrer proposes that my notion of relevant similarity is best understood in terms of exemplarization, and I am happy to accept that this is at least part of the picture. But where Lehrer suggests that I shift my emphasis from the artist’s intention to the artist’s choice, I argue that appeal to intention per se remains crucial to my account. Sherri Irvin argues that the artist must determine what is required for two works to count as relevantly similar. I accept this, since it incorporates the determination of relevant similarity within the art-attempt. Irvin also suggests that, according to my view, a successful copy-attempt satisfies the criteria for being a successful art-attempt, an undesirable result. In response, I further develop the notion that making an art-attempt involves being responsible for the way in which the work satisfies the criteria for arthood.

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