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  • Indonesia in 2017:Jokowi's Supremacy and His Next Political Battles
  • Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (bio)

After successfully consolidating his power in his second year in office (2016), 2017 saw President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) gradually and consistently expand his power base to strengthen his political authority in Indonesia to the point that he was able to weaken opposition forces both in and outside parliament. Against predictions, he successfully reduced political tensions arising from the two high-profile events that occurred in early 2017: first, the defeat of the ethnic Chinese, Christian Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in the Jakarta election and, second, the two-year prison sentence handed to Ahok for blasphemy. Jokowi responded to these events decisively, with constitutional initiatives and political manoeuvres aimed at outlawing social and religious organizations deemed to be anti-Pancasila1 and moving to limit the impact of outspoken critics in Jakarta and the countryside. At the grass-roots level, Jokowi visited and consulted with religious and community leaders across Indonesia to gain support for his efforts to reduce what threatened to become an increasing level of religious intolerance and hatred in Indonesian communities.

The Indonesian economy did not improve much, with growth remaining at around 5.1 per cent per annum. This was not enough to fully support Jokowi's ambitious infrastructure programmes, leading him to deploy available resources and funding inside and outside the country to ensure those programmes stayed on track. In terms of foreign policy, Jokowi continued to attract prominent international [End Page 153] state visitors to Indonesia, and participated actively on the world stage in forums such as the G20, ASEAN and APEC meetings, and a visit to China to participate in the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) gathering organized by President Xi Jinping. The highlight of Jokowi's regional engagement was his quick response to domestic pressure to address the plight of the Rohingya refugees who became stranded along the Myanmar–Bangladesh border. Towards the end of 2017, his third year in office, Jokowi harvested the fruits of his efforts, with independent public opinion polls showing him to have an unprecedented level of support, making him, at this time, the most powerful and popular political leader in Indonesia.

This chapter will highlight key trends in Indonesia in 2017 in the areas of domestic politics, the economy and foreign policy. It will discuss the ways in which Jokowi navigated the complex Indonesian political landscape and stayed on top of the game. It will examine briefly the implications of local elections for governors across Indonesia in 2018 and consider the consequences for Jokowi's looming political battles in the 2019 presidential election of the arrest of Setya Novanto, the Chairman of the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), and the appointment of Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto as the new Armed Forces Chief.

Domestic Political Developments

Spillovers from Mass Protests at the End of 2016

There was no doubt that in the last months of 2016 Indonesian politics was preoccupied with the drama that centred on the mass protests against Ahok on 4 November 2016 (which became known as the 4/11 protest) and on 2 December 2016 (the 2/12 protest). These mass protests in front of the Presidential Palace and in the vicinity of the National Monument (Monas), both involving more than a million people, were the largest political protests of the Jokowi presidency.2 They were organized by a broad-based alliance of Islamic and social organizations called the National Movement of the Guardian of MUI Fatwa (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI, GNPFM) led by Bachtiar Nasir and Rizieq Shihab, the latter being also the leader of the radical Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). This alliance was established after the Indonesian Muslim Scholars' Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) issued a fatwa (a religious verdict) stating that Ahok had committed blasphemy in a speech made in September 2016. The case originated with a complaint made about a video clip that circulated on YouTube in which Ahok was seen citing the Qur'anic verse Al Maidah 51 to advise his audience in the Thousand Islands area in Jakarta Bay of the danger [End Page 154] of being influenced...

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